THE MORALS OF SUICIDE

CONTAINING

PART I. REVIEWS AND FURTHER STATISTICS

PART II. AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY

BY

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"Dark is the world to thee: thyself art the reason why.
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel, I am I?"

The Higher Pantheism (TENNYSON).

VOLUME II.

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PREFACE TO VOL. II.

WHATEVER else I may have to complain of, I cannot complain that the first volume of my book on *The Morals of Suicide* has failed to attract attention. Not only in England and Scotland has it been extensively reviewed, but also in the United States, in India and Australia. Apart altogether from the very diverse character of these reviews, of which I shall speak later on, this proves that the importance of the subject is fully recognized. So far so good. And I hardly need say, that had I not been deeply and even painfully impressed with its importance, I should never have essayed to write on a subject so naturally uninviting. Perhaps there is none which brings us into closer touch with the weaknesses, the wants, the sin, the misery, and, I may add, the misfortunes of mankind than this. We seem in considering and investigating it to lay our finger

upon the pulse of the great social body. We feel it, so to speak, throbbing beneath our touch; and if, like the physician of bodily ailments, we have any powers of diagnosis, we ought to be able to gain some insight into the patient's condition, and some knowledge of the disease from which he is suffering. Truly there is scarcely a malady of body, mind, or soul which does not contribute its quotum to the death-roll of suicide. And if my book has been the means of directing the attention of thoughtful philanthropic men and social reformers to a subject so grave and important, I ought to be thankful, however little fresh light my own labours may have thrown around it. And I am thankful; for I cannot but believe that others, far wiser and more able than myself, will be prompted to come to the rescue, and consider what can be done to mitigate or remove those causes and social evils of which suicide is at once the index and the outcome.

Reviewers on the staff of journals, which rank amongst the highest in the land, in literature, science, and philosophy, have given me a thoughtful and dispassionate hearing. I do not doubt for a moment they are gentlemen fit in every sense

for the lofty position they fill, and the arduous and responsible duties which, as critics, they have to perform. And I desire before going a step further to tender them, one and all, my sincere and respectful thanks.

Whatever the nature of their criticisms—and it would be absurd to expect they should all agree—I do not doubt that those criticisms are the expression of genuine conviction. I suppose we are all in quest of truth, and honest criticism, even though severe, is not a thing to be deprecated, because, like the winnowing blast, it separates the corn from the chaff.

And, truly, the critiques which have appeared have not only been numerous, but well-nigh as varied as numerous. Almost every degree of praise and censure is to be found amongst them. Indeed, they would afford ample material for a study of mental idiosyncrasy, did I care to put them to such a purpose; and I confess it has both amused and astonished me to find how the same work should have called forth views and opinions so widely divergent. By some of my critics I am accused of opening the door to too many side issues, which seemed to lie outside the legitimate

scope of inquiry. And the *Church Quarterly* reviewer charges me with bringing myself and my readers into deep waters. There is some truth, perhaps, in both these accusations. In reply, I would merely say at this point, that the subject is so many-sided, and so intimately bound up with various aspects of human life and experience, that it is extremely difficult to say what side issues are not more or less pertinent to the thorough investigation of it. For example, the sense of Responsibility has a very close bearing on suicide. But Responsibility involves the consideration of Personality, without which it cannot be said to exist. Here, then, at once, we are necessarily brought into deep water. The worst of it is, that in the present volume I cannot promise my readers or critics a return to the calmer waters and shallower depths of ascertained truth. We shall still be on a voyage of discovery. But I ask them not to forsake me, but keeping open "the weather eye" of a healthy and impartial criticism, assist in making some addition to our stock of human knowledge and happiness. I have ventured, I know, to handle great subjects and difficult ones, and in so doing I have exposed myself to the criticism of

men who are probably more conversant with them, and better able to deal with them than myself. I humbly apologize for my presumption, and whether in some points I am right or my critics, I beg them at least to believe that I am actuated by one motive only, to promote the welfare of humanity.

The Essay on Personality may be called the Argument for a Personal Prius as deduced from, or implied in, Christian Theology and Metaphysic. And it will be seen from the footnotes to how large an extent I have endeavoured to strengthen my position by extracts from Professor Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, in which practically the same subject is treated from a somewhat different standpoint, but in which the same conclusion is arrived at.

And now, perhaps, it will be asked, What is the end and object to be gained by this dissertation on Personality?

The importance of the subject was brought home to me by Schopenhauer's dictum of "the unassailable right" of a man to destroy himself if he chooses. *Cui non libet vivere licet mori.* And certainly, if there be no personality other and

higher than his own, I do not see how this right can be denied him. My original object, then, was to try and deepen the sense of responsibility which attaches to life, by a more careful investigation of its most probable origin, and the obligations and conditions which that origin implies.

This, as it seemed to me, could not be done without an effort to show the connection which must ever exist between Metaphysic and Religion on the one hand, and between Religion and Morality on the other. For Metaphysic is the attempt to discover a theory of the Universe acceptable to reason and philosophy. And Religion is the same theory translated into popular language, and clothed in the form and raiment of worship. It is truth as an object of reason and intelligence, when it becomes the subject of faith and sentiment. And Morality is the product of Religion in its practical effect on character and conduct. What the metaphysical basis is, such will be the Religion which expresses it, and what the Religion, such the Morality. But truth is one, though many-sided. And the true Religion and the true Morality must also be able to justify themselves when subjected to the metaphysical test.

My aim has not been to prove the truth of the Christian Religion, but to show that it rests upon, and is the expression of, a Metaphysic which presents an intelligible and reasonable view of the facts and phenomena of the Universe, whether material or spiritual, whether mental or moral. I have endeavoured to show, however imperfectly, that there is a Christian Metaphysic as well as a Christian Religion, and that there exists between the two a harmony and consistency which strengthens both, and affords a strong presumption that both are true. Lastly, I have sought to prove that Personality is the essential principle which underlies them both, which renders them both intelligible, and without which neither could exist.

From Personality springs the sense of responsibility. If Metaphysic expresses itself in religion, and religion begets its corresponding morality in character and conduct; so, if the theory of Personality as propounded by the Christian system of Metaphysic and Religion be true, then my own personality at once becomes conditioned by its relation to other personalities, and chiefly to that Supreme Personality from Whom it springs. I

am not an isolated personal unit, coming I know not whence, going I know not whither, without purpose, without end, the product of blind fortuity. I am not free to do what I like with myself. I am not an irresponsible agent, and Schopenhauer's contention of man's "*unassailable right*" to destroy himself, if he be so minded, becomes in the highest degree immoral and untenable.

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PART I.

REVIEWS AND FURTHER STATISTICS

CHAPTER I.

REVIEW OF PRESS NOTICES AND CRITIQUES.

Spectator—Christian Advocate—Independent (N. York)—London Quarterly Review—Church Review—Western Morning News—Literary World—Daily Chronicle—St. James's Gazette—New York Times—Review of the Week—Saturday Review—Liverpool Daily Post—British Medical Journal—Lancet—Medical Press—Indian Church Quarterly Review—Critic (N. York)—Globe—Democrat—American Ecclesiastical Review—Church Quarterly Review.

I WISH it to be understood that in this review I am not so much concerned about defending myself, as in examining the views and statements of my critics. My object will be rather to profit by criticism than to refute it. I shall consider the notices pretty much in the order I have received them ; and, I may add, that many of them, being little more than a summary of contents, do not present much to call forth any remarks.

The Spectator, January 26, 1901.

The Reviewer must allow me to thank him sincerely for his appreciative and favourable

critique. I only wish it were better deserved; but if my labours bear fruit in the direction he prognosticates, I shall feel to be abundantly repaid. To be told, on so high an authority, that my book is "very valuable for the statistical and other information that it supplies as to the growth of suicide and insanity in the world, and as to the relations between them and certain social evils, of which the chief is intemperance," is a compliment, of which I am, as I ought to be, deeply sensible.

I have been accused by one of my critics (the *Lancet*) of want of sympathy for those who find themselves "cornered in the battle of life." It is, therefore, an intense relief to find that, in the judgment of others, whose opinion is equally trustworthy and valuable, "the book is so full of faith and hope and charity, of wise counsel and tender sympathy, that it cannot fail to be of ethical as well as of psychological and sociological importance."

The Christian Advocate and *Independent*,
New York City.

The notices which appeared in these journals lay me under a debt of gratitude. My book, I am sure, is in many respects far from being "an admirable one." On the contrary, I am fully

conscious of its many imperfections. But if, indeed, it is found to be "stimulating and suggestive, and containing a great deal of information," that is enough for me. And heartily do I re-echo the wish of one of my kindly critics, that my words of warning and advice "could fall under the eye of many who stand at the parting of the ways before it is too late." God help thee, my brother! My sympathy and prayers are thine.

The London Quarterly Review, July, 1900.

The writer objects to the term "Christian Socialism," which he thinks would be better described as "Christian Altruism." But I would reply that, though Altruism is one of the leading features of Christian Socialism, it does not adequately express the objects or the work of *the Christian Social Union*. Even Morselli and the Comtists, with Mr. Harrison as their chief exponent in this country, are Altruists. But *the Christian Social Union* has its origin in the recognition of the Fatherhood of God as revealing the Brotherhood of man. And its object is to secure the acknowledgment of Christ as "the ultimate authority" in all the manifold relationships and activities of social life. I notice with pleasure my

critic's admission, that "the remedy, if indirect, would undoubtedly be effective. The universal keeping of the golden rule would prevent most of the conditions out of which the crime of self-murder grows." This is all I contend for. The aim of the Union is to leaven every class and department of social life and industry with the principles and precepts of Christianity. By so doing it hopes to ameliorate the conditions of life for all classes of the community down to the lowest. For, while education renders life more attractive to the few, and opens out fresh avenues of employment to those who can avail themselves of it, it seems to do little towards improving the conditions of life for the masses. In spite of our increasing civilization, the struggle for life is perhaps keener than ever, as is shown by the increasing death-rate through suicide.

Mr. W. W. Westcott, while fully admitting that there are many proximate causes which result in self-destruction, says—

"I should add that in modern times it is the high pressure at which we live, the difficulty of obtaining a livelihood, and the forced education of the young, which fills our asylums and swells our voluntary death-rate." [1]

[1] *Suicide*, p. 143.

The Church Review.

The writer refers to the subjects of Physiological Psychology, and Betting and Gambling. Each of them has, doubtless, an important bearing on suicide. A more fitting place for a few further remarks on the first will be found in the chapters on Personality and Responsibility, but what I have to add to my note on Betting and Gambling may as well be said now as later on.

The terrible increase in this habit is one of the most distressing features of our modern social life. It is thus that some of our judges have alluded to it:—

Mr. Justice Grantham says: "Gambling with book-makers is the cause of more crime and misery than anything else in the land."

Mr. Justice Wills: "When I first came upon the Bench I used to think drink was the most fruitful cause of crime, but it is now a question whether the unlimited facilities for illegitimate speculation . . . are not a more prevalent source of mischief and crime even than drink."

Sir James Vaughan (Bow Street magistrate): "It is sapping the vitals of the nation."

In an appeal put forth by the National Anti-Gambling League in 1900, urging on Local Government authorities the adoption of the by-law

forbidding street-betting, it is stated that this pernicious habit is responsible for no less than *fifty suicides* and embezzlements, and thirty bankruptcies during the past six months in England alone.

At the time I am writing this, a Select Committee of the House of Lords is sitting for the purpose of taking evidence as to the growth of betting. Mr. I. Hawke, Secretary of the Anti-Gambling League, when called upon to give evidence, made some sad and startling disclosures as to the increasing prevalence of betting and gambling in almost every class of the community, from the highest to the lowest. It was spreading amongst postal telegraphists and civil and other public servants. "In the $5\frac{1}{2}$ years from May, 1896, to May, 1901, there had been clearly traceable to betting, 80 *suicides*, 320 embezzlements, and 191 bankruptcies." More drastic legislation was in every way desirable. It is much to be wished that, as a result of the present inquiry, a Bill will be passed to repress the growth of this great social evil, which, as we see so frequently, leads its victims to self-destruction.

The Western Morning News.

The writer has very accurately gauged the purpose and scope of my book in the following passages :—

"The psychology of the materialistic scientist reduces man to an automaton, the psychology of 'the greater hope' finds in human personality a corresponding, but infinitely greater, Personality behind the veil of the flesh."

And again—

"Indeed, the main value of the treatise lies in this solid appreciation of the fact that religion and morality must work hand-in-hand with social progress, if evils of the nature of suicide are to be stamped out."

The Literary World.

There is great truth and value in the following remark. Would that we might see it more generally exemplified !—

"There are, of course, many cases of suicide which cannot be remedied, for which, in fact, there is no remedy; but there are many more where a little kindness, a little practical help, or a little friendly counsel would have tided over what seemed a crisis, and showed life again not at all hopeless or impossible."

The Daily Chronicle.

I fear there is only too much truth in the following remark:—

"The crime (of suicide)—for such it is reckoned by our law—is becoming more frequent, because a belief that there is no conscious life beyond is also becoming more common, though not perhaps among the most thoughtful people."

My critic finds fault with my quotation from "In Memoriam" on the title-page. Let me point out that he has failed to grasp my meaning. The principle, which is writ so large in Nature, of "Life through death," is equally true in the department of man's moral and spiritual life. Only through the mortification of the lower animal passions is the soul set free to soar into the higher and purer atmosphere of spiritual light and liberty. It is only by victory over self that a man can escape those causes and conditions which degrade and enslave him; which rob life of its zest and nobility, and lead him to flee from the evils which encompass him by the act of self-destruction. Surely such a victory as this may well be described in Tennyson's beautiful lines—

"That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

Again says my critic—

"There are quaint, but wholly irrelevant notes on Philology."

If they are irrelevant, then I have nothing more to say. But I cannot admit that they are. Words are like fossils; they have a tale to tell. And just as the crust of the earth contains the record of its past history, so language throws light on the origin and progress of human thought. Words are more than empty sounds, conventional tokens useful for the transfer of ideas, but nothing more. If we can read them aright, and get at their radical meaning, full often they, too, will amply repay the toil: for they will disclose the primitive ideas of the things for which they stand. And certain it is, that a knowledge of the names and terms we use is absolutely necessary for accurate thought. I apologize for alluding, even in self-defence, to truths so obvious.

St. James's Gazette.

Reference is made to the form of verdict usually passed by coroners' juries.

"Mr. Gurnhill is right, we think, when he says some good might result, if attempts at suicide were more rigorously dealt with by magistrates."

The testimony of Mr. W. W. Westcott, Deputy-Coroner for Central Middlesex, on this point ought to carry weight.

"I cannot refrain from saying, that both law and custom with respect to suicide are in a very unsatisfactory and anomalous state. On the one hand, self-murder is ranked by the law as a *felony*, one of the worst of crimes; on the other hand, hardly one suicide a year is called a *felon*. Suicide is not in law any proof of the existence of insanity, yet no sooner is the suicide quite dead, than almost every one cries out that he was insane. Again, an attempt at suicide is a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment, yet a person caught in the act and taken before the magistrates is generally dismissed from custody, not because of insanity, certainly not, because if that were the plea he would be sent to an asylum, and not set free; but let the culprit presently die from a cause dependent on the suicidal injury, and the verdict will be that he was insane. Surely such incongruities cannot be allowed to exist much longer."[1]

New York Times.

The critique which appeared in this journal is both appreciative and discriminating, and I beg to offer the writer my best thanks. With

[1] *Suicide*, by W. W. Westcott, p. 160.

regard to the increase of suicide in the United States, I am glad to say that the figures which appeared in the *Chicago Tribune*—namely, from 987 in the year 1885 to 5750 in 1895—appear to be much exaggerated. For more reliable information I now refer my readers to Chap. II., containing further statistics in the United States.

Review of the Week.

"The chapters in the book are of somewhat unequal merit, and in some cases we should like to have seen fuller treatment—*e.g.* in the discussion of Personality. But this in no way impairs our verdict that the work is a valuable contribution to the literature of sociology, bearing evidences of serious thought."

The subject of Personality is one of great importance in relation to the moral aspect of suicide. Moreover, as it is one of considerable complexity, a fuller discussion of it will be found in the Essay on Personality, which forms the second part of this volume.

The Saturday Review.

The notice which appeared in this paper can neither be called a critique nor a review. Indeed, we might almost suppose the writer had accepted

a brief in defence of suicide. He is pleased to regard my book as to all intents and purposes little more than "a sermon;" and he then goes on to quote evidence showing the want of unanimity as to the lawfulness of suicide amongst different nations in ancient and modern times. I do not suppose any one doubted this; though the statement that suicide was not proscribed by Greek and Roman philosophy must, I think, be accepted with reserve; seeing that Aristotle (*Ethics*, V. chap. xi.) calls it a sin against the State, and says that the memory of the suicide should be marked by infamy.

Under the later Roman Empire suicide became *excessively* frequent, and, indeed, quite fashionable. But what was the cause? The luxury and sloth which predominated amongst the cultured classes, and the dictum of the Stoic School, "*Mori licit cui vivere non placet.*"

But are those examples for us to follow? Are Zeno and Epicurus and the rest, "the followers of Odin and the Brahmins of the East," to influence the conclusions to be drawn from Christian Ethics?

"Suicide," the writer adds, "was permitted by Sir Thomas More in his *Utopia*, and has

been defended by many thinkers in modern times."[1]

The following, I presume, is the passage in the *Utopia* to which my critic refers. I quote it that my reader may see for himself under what circumstances and to what extent Sir Thomas More thought self-destruction to be permissible. I do not remember any other passage in which he alludes to the subject.

"The sick (as I said) they see to with great affection, and let nothing at all pass concerning either physic or good diet, whereby they may be restored again to their health. Such as be sick of incurable diseases they comfort with sitting by them, with talking with them, and, to be short, with all manner of helps that may be. But if the disease be not only incurable, but also full of continual pain and anguish, then the priests and the magistrates exhort the man, seeing he is not able to do any duty of life, and by overliving his own death is noisome and irksome to others, and grievous to himself, that he will determine with himself no longer to cherish that pestilent

[1] It is the custom, I am told, for ladies in Japan to carry about with them a stiletto, with which to take their lives, rather than suffer dishonour. The Czarowitz, when he visited that country some years ago, was attacked by a native policeman. A short time after, a young Japanese woman immolated herself on the spot, to atone, as she thought, for the national disgrace. Both in China and Japan life is held very cheap.

and painful disease. And, seeing his life is to him but a torment, that he will not be unwilling to die, but rather take a good hope to him, and either despatch himself out of that painful life, as out of a prison or a rack of torment, or else suffer himself willingly to be rid out of it by others. And in so doing they tell him he shall do wisely, seeing by his death he shall lose no commodity, but end his pain. And because in that act he shall follow the counsel of the priests, that is to say, of the interpreters of God's will and pleasure, they show him that he shall do like a godly and a virtuous man. They that be thus persuaded, finish their lives willingly, either with hunger, or else die in their sleep without any feeling of death. But they cause none such to die against his will, nor they use no less diligence and attendance about him, believing this to be an honourable death. Else he that killeth himself *before that the priests and the council have allowed the cause of his death*, him, as unworthy either to be buried or with fire to be consumed, *they cast unburied into some stinking marsh*."[1]

From this passage my readers will be able to judge for themselves how far, and under what circumstances, Sir Thomas More justified suicide.

But who are the many thinkers of modern times? Does my critic refer to Schopenhauer and his followers of the Pessimistic School? If

[1] *Utopia* (The Camelot Series), p. 158.

so, he is welcome to their patronage and support. Perhaps he had Dr. Donne in mind, who wrote *Biathanatos* in defence of suicide. But this work was not published till long after the author's death. It is very plain to see that he was far from being proud of it. And if he could have been consulted, in all probability it would never have been published at all.

Liverpool Daily Post.

"Even the title is challengeable, for it goes without saying that suicide has no morals."

The writer, however, is kind enough to say that the book is eminently instructive on this saddening subject.

As to the title, I confess I fail to see much difference between "Morals" and "Ethics."[1] The distinction, if distinction there be, seems to me rather subtle and insignificant than practical and real. Of course, by "The Morals of Suicide" I mean the moral aspect of suicide. And in this sense it certainly is not true "that suicide has no morals."

[1] "Morals" is derived from Lat. *Mos* = a manner, or custom; "Ethics" from Gr. ἔθος, which has the same meaning.

British Medical Journal, Lancet, and *Medical Press.*

I attach great importance to the reviews which have appeared in these three journals, and, as an expression of the opinion of the medical faculty, they demand the utmost respect. The ministers of Christ and medical men should surely regard themselves as fellow-workers in the cause of humanity. The welfare of mankind and the healing of their diseases are the objects which they both have in common. It is true that they are not working in exactly the same department of human nature. In the one case the bodies, in the other the souls of men are, broadly speaking, the objects of regard; nor are the medicines or the methods in each case the same. But it should never be forgotten that the two departments frequently overlap; that man is a unity combining two elements, body and soul, flesh and spirit; that these are mutually dependent, and that the health and welfare of the one cannot long be maintained if those of the other are neglected. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the example and teaching of Him Whom we ministers of religion call the Great

Physician. It was not only the diseases of the souls of men that excited his sympathy, but every form of human suffering. The foul leper, the devil-driven epileptic, the lame, the blind, the deaf and the dumb appealed to His compassion and received His gifts of healing.

For these reasons I felt deeply interested to know what the medical journals would say about my book.

The British Medical Journal says—

"We should welcome any suggestions to abate the evil of suicide. But we do not think that Mr. Gurnhill's suggestions are of practical use."

Did my critic expect me to discover a specific remedy for suicide? He knows, as well as I do, that none such exists. But, if my suggestions are worthless, has he any others to offer? Apparently not. What, then, are my suggestions? They resolve themselves into this: that, having ascertained some of the more general and persistent causes of suicide, we should *attack those causes*. Thus, for example, it is proved beyond a doubt that a large percentage of cases is directly due to drink, another large percentage to betting and gambling, and so on. Is, then, my

suggestion that we might reduce the number of suicides by reducing the amount of drinking, betting and gambling, and similar vices "of no practical use"? Let my reader decide for himself.

Dr. Magnus Huss, in his standard work on Chronic Alcoholism, stated—

"that the suicidal impulse is a more frequent accompaniment of the melancholia of drunkards than of melancholia from other causes, and, further, that amongst the uneducated classes suicide frequently follows on the disordered emotional tone, which sooner or later results from the abuse of alcoholic liquors."

Again, Dr. W. C. Sullivan, Deputy Medical Officer of H.M. Prison, Pentonville, in an article on "The Relation of Alcoholism to Suicide," after referring to the Registrar-General's Returns, as showing the close connection between a high rate of alcoholism and a corresponding frequency of suicide, points out that the explanation is to be found in the visceral and organic depression, and consequent melancholic tendency resulting from alcoholism, which are powerless to overcome suicidal impulses arising during intoxication, whereas in healthy subjects such impulses speedily vanish and come to nought.

The Lancet.

This review is a curious mixture of praise and blame. The reviewer asks why should suicides be amenable to any arguments? Especially as "I excuse myself from dealing with the arguments of Pliny, Seneca, and others, who have expressed approval of suicide under certain conditions."

In reply, I would venture to remind my critic, that I stated plainly I approached the subject from the standpoint of the Christian Socialist; and, consequently, that I never undertook to collate and compare the views and arguments set forth by ancient Greek and Latin writers. But I am not afraid to meet my critic on his own ground. He quotes Pliny the Elder, and Seneca, and others, who have expressed approval of suicide. I could quote Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Æschines, Virgil, and Pliny the Younger, all of whom denied its permissibility and strongly condemned it.

Again, I am accused of "a great want of thoroughness," because "from cover to cover there is not a word about that awful problem—the duty that sometimes corners the true Christian and good citizen—of laying down his life." "The tragedy, the problem, the unselfish dread of

becoming burthensome, or of cankering a young life with the infirmity of an old one—these things do not exist for the author, who can speak of suicide only with horror as 'this deadly sin.'" But surely the argument for suicide, which is suggested in these words is one which would equally justify the custom, which we are told prevails amongst some of the Indian tribes —of tomahawking their aged parents when they become useless and burthensome. I confess I dare not espouse such an argument, for I do not know where it would lead me. And yet I should be truly sorry if my critic were to think me wanting in sympathy for those unhappy beings who find themselves "cornered" in "the battle of life." God forgive me, if I were; for I know full well how truly awful and tragic is the dilemma in which they sometimes find themselves placed.

But, if the laying down of our lives for the sake and the good of others is to be called suicide, then Jesus Himself was not only a suicide, but He bade all His disciples follow His example. "He laid down His life for us, and we ought to lay down own lives for the brethren."[1] This is

[1] 1 John ii. 16.

quite true; nevertheless, we must not complicate the question by the confusion of ideas. I grieve that my critic should have so far misunderstood me; but, seeing that he has, I do not wonder he concludes his critique as he does. For myself I would only say, that my motive has been more than he imagines; more than to provide dissuasive arguments for those *comparatively* few persons who, contemplating self-destruction, are yet open to the voice of reason and religion; more than to save a few hundreds or thousands from a suicide's grave. Rather has it been to represent suicide as the symptom and index of those festering sores, moral and social, which afflict humanity, and that with a view to their healing.

The Medical Press.

This review is thoughtful and appreciative, but by no means eulogistic. It is gratifying, however, to find that the writer thinks my book, in spite of its many defects, of which no one is more conscious than its author, "deserving of intelligent perusal." I do not ask for more.

With regard to "a functional relation existing between every act of thinking, willing, or feeling on the one side, and some molecular change in

the body (the brain) on the other side," my critic will find some further remarks in the essay on "Personality." This, I hope, he will also do me the honour to criticize.

"In this work," he says, "the preacher is much in evidence." It is not my wish either to preach, or sermonize, except in the proper place. But I do hold, and firmly hold, that religion and the religious instincts of man are facts which must be faced and treated, like any other facts, in a scientific manner. If they be real they must justify their reality as part of the great body of philosophic and metaphysical truth.

The Indian Church Quarterly Review, April, 1901.

I beg to thank the reviewer for his kind commendation of my book. His remarks about the neglect of Moral Theology in the English Church are, I fear, only too true.

"If the English Church ever really took serious notice of the evils which are preying upon the lives of the inhabitants of her great towns, and perhaps even to a greater degree of the villages, she would insist on her candidates for Holy Orders acquiring some considerable knowledge of the principles of Moral Theology."

The Critic (New York City).

This notice is brief and almost amusing. And yet, withal, there is a spice of truth about the writer's suggested remedy.

"The folly of suicide needs to be insisted upon in these days, rather than its possible sinfulness. In five cases out of six a good dinner will do more to ward off self-destruction than a barrel full of sermons and texts."

Similarly Mr. W. W. Westcott, in his chapter on the prevention of suicide, says—

"Suicidal patients require most watching early in the morning: a good lunch often dispels the tendency *for the day*."[1]

There is no doubt that a great number of persons are annually driven to suicide through want and destitution. But how is the good lunch or dinner to be brought within their reach? Here is the great problem for Christian socialists and philanthropists to solve.

But the same writer, whose practical acquaintance as a coroner with the subject of suicide renders his testimony deserving of special respect, though he does not prescribe "a barrel full of

[1] *Suicide*, p. 170.

sermons and texts," speaks out very clearly on the value of religion as a preventive. His words are worth quoting.

"The cultivation of a religious conviction of the sanctity of life and the sin of a self-inflicted death is a more certain hindrance to suicide (than education). Persons who are unable to obtain this mental conviction, are, I believe, more prone to take their lives in time of trouble; and beyond good advice, and the care of their friends, I do not know that any means exist to restrain them."[1]

Globe Democrat (St. Louis, M.C.).

The following extract is worth notice:—

"If ministers can help in the matter by sermons, prayers or treatises, very well; but the main relief is in wholesome life and robust health. Good morals promote all this, and so indirectly touch the main question."

American Ecclesiastical Review.

The notice which appeared in this Review is one of the most thoughtful and discriminating of any I have seen; and I beg to thank the writer for his candid, even though severe criticism.

[1] *Suicide*, p. 172.

There are, however, two or three points which I cannot pass over in silence.

1. He considers my definition of *personality* as very inadequate, and is of opinion that no more adequate definition has ever been formulated than that of Boethius, "Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia." As, however, my readers will find the subject of Personality discussed at some length in the essay which forms the second part of this volume, I will only point out in this place that my definition of Personality was framed to express the fundamental idea, latent in the etymology of the word *persona*, as denoting first a mask, and secondly the actor who speaks through, or behind, the mask.

2. But the next point of criticism demands a more careful consideration. The wastage of philanthropic effort through want of union and co-operation amongst Christians led me to consider the causes of division leading to a loss of the moral and spiritual power which ought to be available for the amelioration of the social, moral, and religious condition of mankind.

Amongst these causes, I pointed out, was the lack of obedience to the rules and precepts of Christ Himself. And as a striking instance of

this disobedience I quoted the action of the Roman Church in withholding the cup from the laity, and so delivering *a mutilated sacrament* to the people. The charge, I admit, is a very grave one, and I cannot wonder it has seriously disturbed the mind of my Roman Catholic critics. But the question is, can it be substantiated? For, if not, I am bound to withdraw it.

My critic accuses me, in the first place, of being untrue to the first principles of my own position, and he then goes on to say—

"If Christ, the God-Man, commissioned His apostles (and their lawful successors) to teach men all things whatsoever He had commanded them, and if He promised to be with them in their appointed official duty unto the end of time, so that the powers of hell should never prevail against the teaching organism He had constituted, either He, the God-Man, was unfaithful to His promise, or else the organism, which traces its origin historically back to Him, could not be permitted by Him to 'make void the Word of God,' and 'to proffer to the thirsty souls of men a mutilated sacrament.'"

But the writer does not seem to see that in this passage he is giving himself and his case away completely. What did Christ commission

His apostles to do? To teach men to observe all things whatsoever He had commanded them.[1] Has the Roman Church done this? "Drink ye all of this," said Christ. "No," says the Roman Church, "you must *not* do so. I will absolve you from your obedience to Christ. It is quite sufficient for you to receive the Sacrament in one kind."

Doubtless Christ did promise His Presence with His apostles and their successors. But He attached a condition to His promise—that of "teaching men to observe all things He had commanded them"—and this condition the Roman Church has failed to fulfil, not only by omission, but also by addition; not only by withholding the Cup and so proffering a mutilated Sacrament to the people, but also by setting up a system of mediation[2] for which

[1] St. Matt. xxviii. 20.

[2] As an illustration of the length to which the Church of Rome has gone and is prepared to go, I quote the following extract from the late Dean Church's Article on 'Our Irenicon,' republished in vol. i. p. 352 of his *Occasional Papers*:—

"From the single consideration of what was fitting and 'congruous' to the Mother of our Lord, a whole system has grown up, and expanded to proportions which, to those who were not under its influence, appear simply inconceivable and incredible. Inference has been piled upon inference, deduction has been drawn out from deduction, each growing more astounding than its predecessor. . . . The only way of describing what it all results in is by saying, that what the general sense of Christians has considered for centuries to

there is not a vestige of authority in the words, the teaching, or the commandments of Christ.

Let us see what is the history of this strange infraction of Christ's express command.

In the Catholic Dictionary we read: "Down to the Middle Ages the faithful usually received the Eucharist under both kinds." Two Popes (Leo I., 440, and Gelasius, 490) specially condemned the Manichæans for withholding the Cup, and commanded them to be expelled from the fellowship of saints. The practice was condemned by the Council of Clermont (1095) and by Pope Paschal II. (1118) as "a human and novel institution, a departure from what Christ the Master ordained and did."[1] Then came the Council of Constance positively forbidding Communion in

be the special and incommunicable prerogatives of the Saviour of mankind are now claimed, sometimes with something that marks superiority, for his mother. . . . When she is proved in deliberate dogmatic language, duly guarded by appropriate distinctions, to be what she is frequently called, our 'co-redemptress,' it might be thought that the zeal of her devotees had reached its limit, but they have advanced one step further, and laid down that she, too, is present and is received in the Eucharist; they have not only maintained her co-presence, but defined the manner of her presence" (pp. 353, 354).

[1] Dearden's *Modern Romanism Examined*, p. 168. See also Pelliccia's *Polity of the Christian Church*, who admits that it was not until after the thirteenth century that the custom of receiving the Cup at the Holy Communion began gradually to fall into disuse in the Western Church, p. 453.

both kinds to the laity; and lastly, the Council of Trent confirming the decision of Constance and pronouncing its anathema against those poor souls who would fain keep the commandments of Jesus.[1]

What an extraordinary history! One Council reverses the decrees of a former one. One Pope sanctions what previous Popes had condemned as disloyalty to Christ. Yet all are infallible! And, as though the climax of inconsistency had not been reached, the last Pope (Pius IV.) and the last Council (Trent) presume to revise the very ordinance of the Founder Himself, and forbid obedience to one of His most imperative commands! Only on one plea can such action be justified—the plea and claim of possessing a wisdom and authority superior to that of the Founder of Christianity Himself. Does my critic make this claim on behalf of the Roman Church? If he does, I have not another word to say. If he does not, then what escape is there from the charge that the Roman Church, in adding to, and subtracting from, the teaching of Christ, has "made void the Word of God," and proffered to the thirsty souls of men *a mutilated Sacrament?*

[1] Council of Trent, Art. XVII. and XVIII.

But even this, sad as it is, is perhaps not the saddest feature in the case. Rome stands committed to her errors. By the decree of Papal Infallibility she has crystallized and stereotyped them upon her. They have become not merely accretional, but organic. And this is a matter for profound regret, because it renders the hope of reunion remote indeed.

And because I have pointed out this instance of disobedience to the teaching and precepts of Christ, as a cause of disunion amongst His followers, entailing a loss of moral and spiritual force, I am no Catholic. Truly I do call and consider myself a Catholic, in the sense of holding all the Articles of the Catholic Faith. At the same time I humbly hope I shall never cease to be a Protestant in the sense of protesting against the unwarranted and unscriptural additions which the Church of Rome has made to that Faith. I confess I do not see how I can withdraw my charge.

My critic has coupled his review of my book with that of another, *The Bible and its Interpreter ;* And he adds—

"In the position established in the latter work lies the only hope for the unity of faith and

loyalty of obedience for which Mr. Gurnhill pleads, and in which alone is there healing for the individual and the nations."

Now, I have been at the trouble to procure this work. It is written by the Rev. P. H. Casey, S.J., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in Woodstock College, and appears with the imprimatur of the Archbishop of Philadelphia. The main object of it is to prove that the Roman Church, being infallible, is the true interpreter of Holy Scripture. Nay, more than this, "Churches that cannot claim infallibility—and what Protestant Church or Churches dare claim it?—*are not a part of the Catholic and Apostolic Church; they lie outside it; they are cut away from it.*"[1]

And so, forsooth, the Church which has not scrupled to read a "not" into one of our Lord's most imperative commands; which has invented and still maintains a system of mediation for which not a shred of evidence is to be found in Holy Scripture; which presumes to declare all Churches which cannot claim infallibility to be no part of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to lie outside it, and to be cut away from it; this

[1] *The Bible and its Interpreter*, pp. 90, 91.

Church is to be for Christendom the infallible interpreter of the Bible! Comment is needless.

The Church Quarterly Review.

The writer is disposed to find fault with me because I have attached "too expansive a sense" to the title of my book. He has read it "not exactly perceiving why one chapter precedes another, doubting now and then whereunto this discursive treatment will grow, realizing with some alarm that the author has brought himself and us into deep water." He has been unable to solve the enigma of "the symbolical device on the cover." He does not see the least connection between "the lines from Tennyson" quoted on the title-page and the subject in hand. I am truly sorry for having so grievously perplexed him. But, then, we cannot swim in a duck-pond, and if we wish to catch anything bigger than minnows we must not be afraid sometimes "to launch out into the deep." But to be serious, my critic must pardon me if I say, with all respect, that he appears unable to take in that aspect of the subject which to me seems its most important and significant one—its aspect as a symptom and index of those many and various evils which afflict the social body,

and which are the active causes leading to self-destruction. To deal with these causes, even in a cursory manner, must, I hardly need point out, involve from time to time "frequent enlargements of scope."

My critic finds fault with me again for what I have said about the action of the State with reference to religious teaching in English Board Schools. I regret that I should have expressed myself in terms which are not formally and literally true. What I meant was that the ministers of the various religious denominations have no *locus standi*, no recognized right to enter a Board School and impart religious instruction. Boards of managers, I know, can do almost what they like in the matter; but, as a general rule, ministers of religion are not asked, and therefore cannot teach. In saying this, I am speaking from my own experience.

Before taking leave of my critics, which I do with sincere respect and gratitude, I cannot refrain from expressing a feeling of disappointment, that so few of them, especially those representing the more distinctive Protestant forms of Christianity, have examined my suggestions as to the basis of the reunion of Christendom. What

worthier object, I ask, could Christians set before them for attainment during the century on which we have so recently entered, than the reconciliation of their differences, that so with one heart and one mind they might co-operate in the work of their common Lord? Great are the powers of evil for the destruction of mankind; but great also are the powers of Christ's Church if only they be concentrated and applied.

CHAPTER II.

FURTHER STATISTICS OF SUICIDE.

I. In England and Wales.
II. In the United States.

I.—England and Wales.

From the Registrar-General's Report for 1900 it appears that the number of actual suicides in England and Wales during 1900 exceeded those of 1899 by 52—namely, of males, 45; females, 7.

The following table gives the total number of suicides, male and female, for the years 1890 and 1900, together with the approximate rate per 100,000 of the whole population of England and Wales, and the increase during the decade:—

TABLE I.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Year.	Number of Suicides.			Rate per 100,000 of Population, Males and Females.
	Total.	Males.	Females.	
1890	2205	1635	570	7·7
1900	2896	2166	730	9·2
Increase during decade	691	531	160	1·5
Average annual increase	69·1	53·1	16	0·15

N.B.—I have given in column 5 the rate per 100,000 of population, for the purpose of comparison with a corresponding table, IV., for the United States of America on page 53.

In the volume of Criminal Statistics of England and Wales for 1899, we are informed that within the last forty years actual suicide has increased no less than 115 per cent.; and attempts to commit suicide, which have become known to the police, have increased more than 1000 per cent. in the same period. And even these figures are far from exhaustive, since many cases both of suicide and attempted suicide occur which never come within the cognizance of the law.

"The formidable growth of self-murder," says

Mr. W. D. Morrison, in his article on the above statistics,[1] "within the last half-century, and its persistent increase within the last few years, is a very sinister social phenomenon."

And he adds—

"Most writers who have devoted attention to this sad subject are of opinion that its alarming growth among modern communities is as much due to moral as to economic causes. The immense increase of material wealth in the nineteenth century has been accompanied by a tragic increase of moral misery. This is no doubt to be attributed, in part at least, to the *decay of faith*, and the *growth of pessimism*. . . . One thing, at least, is plain. Men are more than ever in need of the inspiring powers of hope and consolation. To supply this great need is the imperative mission of the Church."

Since the issue of my former volume I have carefully collected all cases of suicide and attempted suicide that have met my eye in the daily newspapers, in order that I might judge for myself as to their nature and, as far as possible, their determining cause. These cases I have analyzed and classified, and I now offer a few remarks such as can hardly fail to be suggested.

[1] *The Guardian*, August 21, 1901, p. 1131.

Observations.

1. In looking over my analysis I observe two features, which stand out with a lurid significant prominence. First, the large proportion of cases in which suicide treads on the heels of crime. First comes crime, very frequently the violent assault ending in murder, and then, to escape the consequences of crime, self-destruction.

2. The second feature is the entire absence of all sense of responsibility in the great bulk of the cases. The restraining influence of religion and morality seems to be growing less and less. This is what Mr. Morrison calls "the doctrine of faith" and "the growth of pessimism." It is the spirit which says, "I dread the pains and penalties of sin in this life, the punishment which man's law can inflict; but as for any other punishment in another life, or any responsibility to a higher tribunal than that of man, I neither know nor care anything about it."

But have we any right to be surprised? Are not such sentiments as these the legitimate product of the factors which are at work in our modern civilization? A scientific Monism is seeking to monopolize the whole field of philosophy;

the worship of humanity to supplant the worship of God ; and a secular socialism to represent the highest aims and interests of mankind. What wonder, when men are taught to regard death as annihilation, it ceases to awaken either hope or fear ; and that, when their circumstances appear desperate, they prefer to slip the cable, rather than try to ride out the storm !

Causes connected with the Amatory Passion— Disappointment, Jealousy.

3. The number of suicides which are due to the miscarriage in some form of the amatory passion — to misplaced, illicit, or disappointed affection, forms another significant feature in the analysis of cases.

The only preventive in such cases as these would seem to be the exercise of greater care and deliberation on the part of young men and women before contracting engagements, and a truer perception of the sanctity of the affections when they have done so. But the practical difficulty in the way of applying such a remedy as this is only too obvious.

Methods of Self-destruction.

4. The extreme variety of the means or instruments employed for self-destruction calls for one or two remarks. The most extraordinary method which I have come across was that adopted by an inmate of the Connaught Hospital, who tried to choke himself by swallowing a tablespoon. Strange to say, although the man swallowed his food with difficulty, and was strange in his manner, and though the doctors suspected some obstruction, they only discovered the spoon wedged in his throat at the *post-mortem* examination.

Abuse of the Revolver.

5. It is impossible to study the annals of suicide as recorded in the daily newspapers without observing how frequently the revolver is chosen as the instrument of death. And the question arises whether some steps ought not to be taken to stop the fatal facility with which these weapons of destruction are procurable. Murder followed by suicide is becoming increasingly common. And one great reason, I feel assured, is because for a few shillings any man can provide himself with the means for the swift execution of both.

If the State interferes with the sale of poisonous drugs, why should it not also interfere in the matter of revolvers, which are equally dangerous and deadly? In the Hampstead shooting case (*Standard*, January 19, 1902), the jury desired the coroner to add a rider to their verdict, calling the attention of the Home Secretary to the indiscriminate sale of revolvers to those having no licence to carry firearms. It certainly seems probable that a law prohibiting the sale of revolvers *except to persons who produce such a licence* would tend to lessen the number of both murders and suicides. To afford facilities for the commission of a crime is next door to a temptation to commit it.

The Verdicts of Coroners' Juries.

6. I have already referred to this subject in my first volume (p. 206), and I need not repeat the remarks I then made. The usual form of verdict still given is that of "Suicide during temporary insanity." And in many cases this verdict is no doubt true so far—but only so far—as it means that the mental balance has been disturbed, and the mind become unhinged, and in that sense deranged. But this loss of balance

and equanimity, this derangement, as in the case of the bodily functions, is due to assignable causes. It is due to the neglect of the rules of

Mental Hygiene.

7. Unwholesome diet, insanitary habits and dwellings, derange the bodily functions. Therefore, wise men are very careful to avoid them. But because the mind and mental faculties are invisible and intangible we are apt to ignore them, and neglect those precautions which are necessary to preserve them in health. There is a science of mental as well as bodily hygiene, and the importance of attending to both was fully recognized by the ancient moralist, *Orandum est nobis ut sit mens sana in corpore sano.*

Our reserve of mental and nervous energy is limited, and when the strain is put upon it, either through excess of work, or intemperance, or worry, or excitement, exceeds those limits, it stands to reason that the mental equilibrium is disturbed. The mind gives way, and that nervous collapse ensues which so frequently ends in suicide.

But it may be asked, is it possible in this work-a-day world—in this life which for many is one of rough-and-tumble, where the weakest must go

to the wall—to avoid this mental strain and consequent nervous exhaustion? No doubt in many cases it is not; but it is equally true that in many cases it is, if proper precautions be taken.

What I mean is this: if through the inordinate love of money, and the haste to become rich, men resort to illegitimate methods of obtaining it, such as betting, gambling, speculation, and fraud; if, through the unbridled love of pleasure and excitement they give the rein to lust or illicit affection; or if, through want of proper care and observation, they overtax their mental powers,—is it to be wondered at, that such courses should end at last in nervous collapse, or a frenzied state of mind, which may be termed "temporary insanity," and in which the unhappy sufferer is no longer wholly accountable for his actions?

Doubtless, if all men could be induced to live according to laws of mental hygiene, and avoid those habits and pursuits which are almost sure to disturb the mental balance and deaden the moral sensibility, we should hear far less of suicide than we do. But, again, the remedy or preventive is very difficult of application; and especially so in the cases of those who need it

most. The work is one, I believe, which only the teachers of the Christian religion and morality can attempt with any prospect of success. Education will not do it. Civilization only intensifies the evil. Sociology, like the gardener's rake, may remove some of the rubbish and smooth some of the roughness which deface the surface of society,[1] but it does not probe the mischief to its root. To do this we need something that will impress men with the sanctity and responsibility of their lives, and show them, at the same time, what is best worth living for.

Child Suicide.

8. The increase of suicide amongst children is much to be deplored. In the Registrar-General's Report for 1899 we find that out of a total of 2121 suicides of persons of all ages, 67, or about three per cent., were under the age of twenty, namely, between five and ten years, 1; ten and fifteen, 6; fifteen and twenty, 60. But out of the first hundred of my collected

[1] For example, intemperance, betting, and gambling, overcrowded dwellings, poverty, and want of work, are amongst the chief causes of suicide; and to effect reforms and remove defects with regard to these things falls within the proper scope of Christian Socialism.

cases of suicide or attempted suicide I find no less than 6 were those of children between the ages of eight and sixteen. I do not say it would be safe to assume that these figures correctly represent the average percentage of child suicide in the present day, but I do think they show that the percentage is on the increase.

It will be interesting, I know, to some of my readers to learn the nature of the causes which were operative in these deplorable cases.

No. 2 is the case of a boy, aged seven, who ran away from school, and, rather than return, drowned himself.

No. 29.—Girl, age not stated. This was clearly a case of over-wrought religious emotion, amounting to mania.

No. 31.—Boy, aged eight, at school, who, in a fit of passion at being punished and sent to bed, hanged himself.

No. 53.—Girl, aged fourteen. Cause: ill-treatment by step-mother; three previous attempts.

No. 90A.—Boy in service, who destroyed himself in a fit of passion at being told to clean some boots.

No. 80.—Boy at public school, aged 16. "Thoroughly tired of school-life."

I will not comment on these cases, for they point their own moral; but they concur in teaching one plain lesson, which is, the need for greater care and consideration on the part of those who are entrusted with the training and education of the young. The opening faculties of the mind, as of the body, may be easily over-taxed, with consequences which cannot be foreseen. Gentleness coupled with firmness should be the invariable rule.

Extraordinary Cases.

9. There are a few cases in my collection which, owing to their exceptional character, call for a few words of comment.

Acute mental distress is frequently the precursor and cause of suicide. But it is astonishing from what comparatively insignificant causes the distress sometimes arises.

No. 108B is the case of a man who was so overwhelmed with grief at the loss of a pony to which he had become greatly attached, that he drowned himself, saying he had nothing left to live for. In another case, a young man hanged himself rather than submit to vaccination. Such

examples show how easily the mental equilibrium is disturbed in some cases.

If there is one word that may be said in extenuation of the crime of self-destruction, it is that the suicide may sometimes by his very act emphasize and call attention to some abuse or festering sore in the social body, and so help to secure its removal or remedy. Such, I think, are the two cases following :—

No. 64.—This is the case of a clergyman of the Church of England, who for eighteen years had been the incumbent of a living with a princely income of £80. Finding himself unable to struggle any longer against his increasing poverty, he asked to be allowed to resign, and had even gained permission to enter a charitable institution; but even this escape from his troubles was denied him. In a letter sent to a friend shortly before his death, he wrote—

"The Bishop seems not to be disposed to accept my resignation, as I should never be able to pay the dilapidations (£300). . . . I shall have to make myself a bankrupt, and afterwards apply to the guardians for admission to the Union-House—a terrible and shocking termination of my life."

If his case excites our deepest sympathy and

compassion, we may at least hope that the reproach it contains for the richest Church in Christendom will not pass by unheeded.[1] You Churchmen and Churchwomen, rolling in all the luxury of untold wealth, think of that poor priest and pastor of your own Church, rising from his sleepless couch one bitter winter morning, driven by poverty and distress to end his miserable existence in a horse-pond!

The next case (No. 181) may truly be termed *a tragedy of old age;* but, alas! only the type of a numerous class.

A poor old man, aged 80, bearing an excellent character, is reduced to a state bordering on starvation because he cannot find work, and the miserable dole of 3*s.* 6*d.* from the guardians is quite insufficient to enable him to support his old wife and keep his home together, so in a fit of utter despair he tries to destroy himself with a table-knife. It is easy to say that his proper course was to go into the workhouse, but we must at least admire the old man's love of freedom and independence, and wonder that our

[1] The number of benefices in the Church of England is about 14,000. Of these, 4704 are worth between £100 and £200 per annum; and about 1500 are less than £100.

boasted civilization should have no alternatives to offer to the industrious and deserving poor in the evening of their days but starvation or the workhouse.

II.—The United States.

The truth of the statement made by the *Chicago Tribune*, that the number of suicides had increased in the United States from 978 in 1885 to 5750 in 1895, at the rate of 500 a year, has been much canvassed. I have, therefore, endeavoured to obtain some trustworthy information on this point, and the results I now lay before my readers.

For this information I am indebted to the kindness and courtesy of Mr. Commissioner Wright of the Labour Department, Washington, and also to Dr. I. S. Billings, Director-in-Charge of the Consolidated Libraries, New York.

I must premise, however, that vital statistics are not collected and recorded in the United States as they are in England and Wales. There is, in fact, no publication answering to the Annual Reports of the Registrar-General in England.

Roughly speaking, the whole country is divided into two parts, the Registration Area and the Non-registration Area; and it is very important to

bear this in mind in seeking to make comparisons or draw conclusions from the statistics published.

The Registration Area, as we can readily understand, is being enlarged year by year. Between 1890 and 1900 it has increased by almost 50 per cent., and now comprehends nearly 29,000,000 of population. The Registration Area now appears to comprise all the more important states, with the exception of Delaware, Maine, and Michigan, and 153 cities of 8000 or more population in other states.[1]

In consequence of the insufficiency of data from the Non-registration Area, the death-rates and ratios for the census of 1900 are based only on the returns from the Registration Area, and in endeavouring to ascertain the truth as to the annual increase of suicide we shall follow the same rule.

TABLE II.—SHOWING THE INCREASE IN THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1890.	1900.
Registration Area	19,659,440	28,807,269
Non-registration Area ...	43,288,274	47,278,525
Total population ...	62,947,714	76,085,794

Increase during the decade = 13,138,080.

[1] See Census Bulletin of August 20, 1901, p. 2.

TABLE III.—SHOWING SUICIDES RECORDED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH PROPORTION DUE TO THIS CAUSE IN 100,000 DEATHS FROM ALL CAUSES IN 1890 AND 1900.

Year.	Total.	Proportion.
1890 1900	3932 5498	467 529
Increase during decade	1566	62
Average annual increase	156·6	6·2

The following table is based on statistics drawn from the Registration Area only :—

TABLE IV.—SHOWING DEATHS FROM SUICIDE IN THE REGISTRATION AREA IN 1890 AND 1900, WITH CORRESPONDING DEATH-RATES PER 100,000 OF POPULATION.

	Total Suicides.	Rate per 100,000 of Population.
In 1890	2027	10·3
,, 1900	3327	11·8
Increase during the decade ...	1300	1·5
Average increase per annum ...	130	0·15

Taken in conjunction with the fact that there has been a decline in the general death-rate in the

Registration Area during the decade 1890–1900, the above increase is all the more significant.

It would seem, then, from the above statistics that the figures quoted by the *Chicago Tribune* are considerably exaggerated, at least for the decade 1890-1900.

During that decade the annual increase in the number of suicides recorded throughout the whole of the United States appears to have been not 500, but 156·6, and in the Registration Area during the same period, 130 or 0·15 per 100,000 of population.

On comparing the statistics in the above Table IV. with those of Table I., giving the corresponding statistics for England and Wales during the same period, it appears that, though the rate of suicides per 100,000 of population, male and female, was 2·6 greater in the United States than in England, yet the increase during the decade 1890–1900 was identical in both countries.

TABLE V.—SHOWING DEATH-RATE FROM SUICIDE PER 100,000 OF POPULATION FOR REGISTRATION AREA AND SOME OF ITS SUB-DIVISIONS, WITH DISTINCTION OF COLOUR AND SEX, IN 1890.

Areas.	Aggregate.			White.			Coloured.		
	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.
Registration Area ...	10·31	16·12	4·53	10·61	16·62	4·63	4·40	6·17	2·68
Cities	11·04	17·35	4·81	11·44	18·01	4·90	4·47	6·55	2·47
States	8·78	13·82	3·85	8·90	14·04	3·87	3·68	4·54	2·86
Cities	9·29	14·87	3·97	9·44	15·12	4·03	3·68	5·57	2·00
Rural	8·00	12·27	3·65	8·08	12·46	3·62	3·65	2·35	5·05
Cities in Non-registration States	12·65	19·55	5·61	13·42	20·75	5·91	4·69	6·81	2·61

This table shows (*a*) that the death-rate was much higher among males than among females, both white and coloured;

(*b*) That the rate was very much higher among whites than among coloured inhabitants;

(*c*) That the rate is highest among white males in Non-registration States, and lowest among coloured females. These latter facts go to support Morselli's contention, that civilization tends to the increase of suicide.

TABLE VI.—Showing Death-rates from Suicide per 100,000 of Population in Registration States during 1890, with Distinction of Conjugal Condition, Sex, Colour, and General Nativity.

Conjugal condition.	Aggregate.		Colour and Nativity.							
			White.						Coloured.	
			Total.		Native-born.		Foreign-born.			
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Single	6·81	2·17	8·86	2·09	4·88	1·60	13·10	3·74	5·01	5·35
Married ...	19·12	4·92	19·44	5·03	16·30	4·46	23·25	5·55	4·18	—
Widowed ...	52·76	7·30	53·96	7·54	42·34	9·71	65·32	4·12	—	—

Remarks—(*a*) The aggregate percentage amongst the widowed males is more than twice that of the married, and more than eight times that of the single.

(*b*) The death-rate among married native-born white males was more than three times that of single native-born white males.

Statistics collected from the Registration States show that the number of suicides among males is nearly four times as great as among females. It was highest of all in New Hampshire (9·83); rural districts, 11·28. Amongst males it was highest of all in the cities in Vermont (22·15), and next in the district of Columbia (18·25).

As regards age, it appears that the rate of deaths per 100,000 is least between the ages of 15 and 45, namely, 10·43, and greatest amongst those of 65 years and over, 27·32; between 45 and 65 it is 24·54. It is highest among males in cities (19·39), and least among females in rural districts (3·34).

In the age group from 45 to 65 the rate was five times as high amongst males (41·44) as amongst females (7·80), and much higher in cities of Registration States (23·06) than in the rural districts (16·91). It was highest among males in cities of 100,000 and over (56·46), and lowest among females in the metropolitan district (7·05).

In the age group of 65 years and over it was nearly seven times as high among males (49·19) as among females (7·80), highest of all among males in cities of Non-registration States (76·00), and lowest of all among females in the cities of the Registration States (6·13).

TABLE VII.—SHOWING, FOR THE REGISTRATION AREA, THE DEATH-RATE FROM SUICIDE AMONG THE WHITES DURING THE CENSUS YEAR 1890 PER 100,000 OF WHITE POPULATION, WITH DISTINCTION OF BIRTHPLACES OF MOTHERS; AND A COMPARISON OF THE SAME WITH ETHNOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES OF SUICIDE AMONGST EUROPEAN NATIONS AS GIVEN BY MORSELLI (*page* 84, *International Series*).

Birthplaces of Mothers.	Rate per Million.	
	United States.	European (Morselli).
Ireland	52·6	30
Italy	64·3	36
Anglo-Saxon	91·6	70
France	109·8	116
Scandinavia	127·2	127·8
Bohemia	221·1	158
Germany	160·9	165

In this table the European nations, or races, are placed in order of their suicidal tendency, beginning with Ireland, which has the lowest. The comparison is remarkable, as showing how closely the tendency exhibited in Europe corresponds with that which prevails amongst their descendants even when transported across the Atlantic and settled in a foreign land.

"The highest numbers of suicides," says Morselli, "are given by countries of Germanic race, and the two stocks, German and Scandinavian, divide this supremacy."[1] The above table seems to corroborate Morselli's contention.

Ireland has the lowest rate among European

[1] *Suicide*, p. 81.

nations; and in the United States the rate is lowest among the offspring of Irish-born mothers. On the other hand, the Germanic races rank highest in Europe, and the highest rate in the United States is found amongst the descendants of those races, with the exception of Bohemia and Hungary.[1]

[1] Morselli does not give the annual number for Hungary.

PART II.

AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY

PREFATORY NOTE

TRUTH in religion must ever be the outcome and expression of truth in metaphysic. And between truth in metaphysic and science it is idle to suppose that any real discrepancy or antagonism can exist. Hence we are placed in the following dilemma: either there is no such thing as metaphysic—and science monopolizes the whole field of epistemology—or the claims of science and metaphysic must be capable of reconciliation. Thoughtful men, I imagine, will hardly be prepared to accept the former alternative, and the following essay is offered, with all due deference, as a humble contribution in support of the latter. In other words, it presents the outline of a system which, in the opinion of the author at least, affords a reasonable basis on which

the claims of science, metaphysic, and religion may be harmonized, and which is capable of dealing with the facts and phenomena of our varied environment, whether material, moral, or spiritual.

PERSONALITY

SECTION I.

Definition—The *a priori* and *a posteriori* views—Personality in Aristotle's Metaphysic—In the Hegelian System—The higher Pantheism—The Formula I = I—The Logic of Hegel contrasted with Christian Metaphysic—Hegel's attempt to reconcile the two.

EXCEPTION has been taken to my definition of Personality, and that of Boethius has been preferred: "*Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia*"—an individual, complete substance, subsisting in a rational nature.[1] But with all due respect to my critic, this definition, to my mind, savours too much of mediæval scholasticism. I doubt, moreover, whether it would convey any very clear and definite idea to ordinary readers. Personality is a subject in which all of us are interested, inasmuch as every man is a person by virtue of possessing an intelligent, self-conscious soul, or spirit. It will be well, however, to avoid

[1] *American Ecclesiastical Review.*

as far as possible all terms and forms of expression which the ordinary reader cannot be expected to understand. I shall, therefore, stick to my guns, and be guided in forming the concept and definition of Personality by the radical idea embodied in the word and its etymological meaning. Self-consciousness, then, I hold to be the essential feature of Personality.[1] And "a person" I conceive of, and define, as a rational, self-conscious being, who thinks, speaks, and acts under the figurative semblance of a mask (*persona*).[2]

But, whichever method we adopt, there are two things to be kept carefully in view, the *terminus a quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*. Reason demands a Prius, or First Cause, adequate to the production of all phenomena. And this Prius is our *terminus a quo*. The human Personality, being, on the whole, the greatest phenomenon of which we have actual experience, is our *terminus ad quem*. These two

[1] "Thus the fundamental characteristic of spirit as we know it in human personality is self-consciousness, the power to make mental distinction between self and other things, and to regard all other things as objects over against our subjective self."—*Divine Immanence*, Illingworth, p. 6.

[2] By metonymy the *persona*, or mask, is used to denote the actor who wears the mask and acts from behind it.

limits represent the whole field of our investigation. Neither may be ignored, and neither separated from the other, seeing they must be, so to speak, organically connected.

Two Points of View—The "a priori" and "a posteriori."

Personality, again, is a subject which may be regarded and discussed from two opposite points of view. The first we may call the *a priori;* the second the *a posteriori.* We may start from the postulated Prius, whatever we may call it, and endeavour to trace downwards the connection between it and the phenomenon of the human Personality to which we are bound to come. Or, on the other hand, reversing the operation, we may begin with the fact of human Personality, and by reasoning backward consider the conclusions it will lead us to form as to the nature of the Prius.

Let us take the *a priori* view first. Many and various have been the speculations as to the existence and nature of the Prius of all things. That a Prius of some kind does exist, and has existed from all eternity, seems to be one of the

necessary laws of human thought. Its existence has been postulated in all the best accredited systems of philosophy, that have ever appealed to the judgment of mankind.

Progress in the Study of Metaphysic.

"If we look to completely elaborated theories," says Professor Baird,[1] "and disregard all tentative and imperfect sketches, it may fairly be said that all that has as yet been done in the region of pure metaphysic is contained in two works, in the *Metaphysic* of Aristotle and the *Logic* of Hegel."

It will be well, then, to consider, in the first place, how and to what extent Personality enters into these two systems.

Personality in the Metaphysic of Aristotle.

The recognition of reason and intelligence in Nature, the employment of means to an end, and the display of something which looks very like design, has not always led to the inference that there must be, behind all natural phenomena, a creative, intelligent, and personal mind. On the contrary, the tendency has often been to invest Nature herself with Divine attributes—that

[1] Art. "Metaphysic" in *Encyc. Brit.*, p. 99, vol. xvi.

is, towards Pantheism. This was not the case, however, with Aristotle. His theory of the universe has long been exploded, and now survives only as an interesting relic of ancient philosophical speculation. And yet it is desirable we should know what it was in outline, if we would correlate rightly his conception of Personality, whether human or Divine.

The earth he held to be the stationary centre of the universe, with the seven planets, including in their number the sun and moon, moving in oblique courses from right to left. But the whole outer heaven, or sphere of the stars, was composed, not of matter, but of a divine ether, moving from left to right, and deriving its motion from the surrounding Godhead, the Essence, or Being, which moves all things, but is Himself unmoved. Aristotle speaks of Him as "the Unmoved Mover of all things." Whatever else He is, He is Personal. He is not pure thought, like Hegel's Prius; for His life is the thinking upon thought. Nor can He think of anything inferior to Himself, for to do so would imply change and degradation. He is a Personal Deity; but He lives aloof from His creatures; and enters into no relations with the material universe. If He is its Maker, He leaves

it to take care of itself. Such was Aristotle's conception of the Prius of all things. He held it to be no abstract impersonal thought, but a personal Deity.

How, then, about man, and the human Personality? Man he conceived of as being partly within, and partly without the sphere of Nature. Within, so far as man is the highest product of Nature, and, in a sense, the end, for which all besides is the means. And yet, he held, there is something about man which does not fall within the sphere of Nature, and therefore transcends Nature. And this something he regarded as coming in *from without*, and therefore belonging to that ethereal essence of which the supernal heavens, and the starry spheres are composed. And thus the Personality of man, by virtue of his reasonable soul, was brought into relationship more or less direct, with his personal Prius, the Unmoved Mover of all things.[1]

Personality in the Hegelian System.

"Pure thought," according to Hegel, is the Prius of all things. But it is not easy to

[1] See Sir Alex. Grant's article on Aristotle in the *Encyc. Britannica*, to which I am partly indebted for the above digest.

ascertain with certainty what he conceived this pure thought to be, and what it contained. In one place we are told "that it must be conceived as a living principle, a principle which only in self-manifestation can be conscious of itself, and to the very nature of which, therefore, self-manifestation is essential." [1]

In another place we are told, "At the basis of all reality, whether material or mental, there is 'thought.' But the thought thus regarded as the basis of all existence is not consciousness with its distinction of ego and non-ego. It is rather the *stuff* of which both mind and nature (? "matter") are made, neither extended as in the natural world, nor self-centred as in the mind. Thought in its primary form is, as it were, thoroughly transparent, fluid, free and mutually interpenetrable in every part—the spirit in its seraphic life before Creation had produced a natural world, and thought had risen to an independent

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Metaphysic," p. 100. The following passages from the article on Metaphysic in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* will be found helpful as laying down the fundamental basis from which self-consciousness proceeds, according to Hegel:—

"In the Hegelian Logic self-consciousness is interpreted as a unity, which realizes itself through difference and the reconciliation of difference—an organic unity of elements, which exist only as they pass into each other."—*Ibid.*

existence in the social organism."[1] Thought, in this primary form, is what Hegel calls the "Idea," which, though fundamental, becomes also final in the process of the world. It only takes the form of consciousness in the crowning development of the mind. Only with philosophy does thought become fully conscious of itself in its origin and development.

Now, whatever we may be able to make out of the above paragraphs, and whether we can assent to them, or not, one thing at any rate seems plain, that Hegel himself did not claim for his Prius, his pure thought, his "Idea," either self-consciousness or personality. We are to regard it as a living principle, indeed, and, as a principle, for ever manifesting itself in the universe, but at the same time as unconscious in and of itself, and only reaching the summit of self-conscious personality in the mind and soul of man.[2]

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Hegel," vol. xi. p. 618.

[2] The criticism of Professor Ward, though directed against Naturalism, is equally applicable to the Hegelian theory of a Prius of pure thought, or "*mind-stuff*." "The more clearly we succeed in mentally depicting such 'mind-stuff' or 'matter-stuff' in its nakedness—it is indifferent which we call it—the more hopeless and absurd will appear the emergence therefrom of a living feeling, Ego, and a known non-Ego."—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. 255.

The inevitable and only legitimate conclusion to which we are led by Hegel's Logic is, that there is but one Personality in the Universe—the Personality of Man. And as for any distinction between a Divine and human Personality, or any relationship between the two, or any responsibility of the latter to the Former, it cannot be maintained. The Divine is the human, and the human is the Divine. The human is not an object to the Divine nor the Divine to the human. Such a system, it is hardly necessary to point out, can never, as regards its theological aspect, rise higher than an intellectual Pantheism, that Higher Pantheism so well expressed in Tennyson's lines—

"Dark is the world to thee: thyself art the reason why;
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel 'I am I'?"

The Higher Pantheism.

It has been said that Hegel, because he grasped the concrete character of thought in itself, was enabled to understand the necessary unity of thought or self-consciousness with the world, and heal the division of physics from metaphysics which Aristotle had admitted.

But, if this be true, then it is evident that the breach has only been healed by the triumph of

Pantheism, and the loss of that which even Aristotle allowed, the existence of Jove as a deity, though somewhat too otiose and neglectful of his duties.

I know I shall be laying myself open to a charge of great presumption, if I venture to make any critical observations on the reasoning and conclusions of the Hegelian Logic and Philosophy in regard to the subject of Personality. If I venture to do so, I wish it to be understood, that I submit my criticisms with the utmost deference to far deeper thinkers and logicians than myself.

1. It appears to me that we are left in a state of uncertainty as to what is to be understood by the Prius of "pure thought." Perhaps we have, or we think we have, some notion of what is meant by "pure thought;" but when we are told it is "mind-stuff"—the stuff of which both mind and nature are made, neither extended and embodied as in the natural world, nor self-centred as in mind, then, I confess, I find myself at sea. Surely, there is here an inconsistency at least, if not a contradiction in terms. Surely "pure thought" must be thought unmixed and uncombined with anything whatsoever beside itself, but especially with matter.

2. Have we any experience of thought, or can we conceive of it, except as the product of the mind of a thinker? As throwing some light on this aspect of the Hegelian system and its relation to the precurrent philosophy of Kant, I venture to quote the following extract from the article on Schopenhauer in the *Encyc. Britannica.*

According to Kant—

"Behind thinking there is the thinker. But to his successors from Fichte to Hegel this axiom of the plain man is set aside as antiquated. Thought, or conception, without a subject-object appears as the principle—thought or thinking in its universality, without any individual substrata in which it is embodied. Thinking (τὸ νοεῖν) or thought (νοήσις) is to be substituted for mind (νοῦς)."[1]

For my part, there seems little or nothing to choose between the "thought" of Hegel and the "will" of Schopenhauer. Both are alike *impersonal* and void of self-consciousness; and I can no more conceive of "thought" without a thinker, than I can of "will" without a "willer." Perhaps I shall be called "antiquated" for holding such a view. Well, be it so.

3. Is the self-manifestation theory satisfactory?

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Schopenhauer," p. 457.

We are told that the Prius of pure thought is self-manifesting, and that it reaches its highest stage of self-conscious personality first in mankind. Now, geology assures us that man appeared on the earth late in the order of animated nature. Assuming, then, that "thought conscious of itself" is a higher form of thought than when in the unconscious stage (otherwise it would be no development), it follows that the only Prius, or living principle, which is the root and source of all existence, whether natural or spiritual, produces something greater than itself. In other words, the stream is made to rise above its source.[1]

4. Again I ask, is not Hegel's theory of a self-manifesting Prius, arriving at self-consciousness and personality in man, an illogical concept, and really a contradiction in terms?

"Only in self-manifestation does the Prius become self-conscious."

But if Nature and the whole universe be the self-manifestation of the Prius then, surely, it follows that whatsoever is manifested, up to the self-conscious personality of man, must be a

[1] It is impossible, beginning with the material world, to explain the mind by any process of distillation or development, unless consciousness, or its potentiality, has been there from the first."—Art. "Hegel," *Encyc. Brit.*, p. 618.

manifestation of the "self" of the Prius, and therefore must have been from the first essentially and potentially inherent in it; that is to say, the Prius must always have been self-conscious and personal, and the theory of an impersonal Prius, reaching self-consciousness through self-manifestation in man is an illogical concept.

The Formula I = I.

This in the Hegelian System is the Formula of the Universe. It denotes the Unity of Thought with itself. Not merely that the Prius of Thought manifests itself in Nature, but that it is one with Nature; that Thought and Matter are two parts or aspects of one organic whole, which stand in the relation to each other of subject and object, and which have no existence except in this relationship.[1]

This is analogous to the doctrine of Divine Immanence, which forms one aspect of Christian Metaphysic—the doctrine of God in Nature.

But the formula I = I, and what it connotes, is one which lends itself equally well to a

[1] "Each factor in this unity, in fact, is necessarily conceived as passing beyond itself into the other; the subject is subject, only as it relates itself to the object, the object is object, only as it relates itself to the subject."—Professor Caird, writer of Art. "Metaphysic" in *Encyc. Brit.*

Pantheistic interpretation. "God is Nature, and Nature is God." And here, as it seems to me, the Logic of Hegel and Christian Metaphysic must part company. The Christian doctrine of the Divine Immanence in Nature may be said to find its analogue in Hegel's self-manifesting Prius of pure thought. But Divine Immanence is only one aspect of Christian Metaphysic; the other is that of the Divine Transcendence. Not only does the Prius manifest Himself in Nature, and so become one with it; but, while doing this, His self-conscious Personality, as distinct from Nature and transcending Nature, is distinctly asserted. And it is just because Hegel failed to safeguard this doctrine of Divine transcendence, that his system can never be really brought into harmony with Christian Metaphysic and the Christian religion.

And yet it does not appear that Hegel was conscious of any real and radical discrepancy between the two. On the contrary, it is evident from his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* that he thought Christianity, regarded in its metaphysical and dogmatic aspect, would be explained and interpreted in accordance with the principles of his own system.

In these *Lectures*, after reviewing the various forms and gradations of religious belief, he comes to what is called the absolute religion of Christianity, in which the mystery of the reconciliation between God and man is openly taught and expressed in Christian dogma.

"God is a Trinity because He is a Spirit. The revelation of this truth is the subject of the Christian Scriptures. The Son of God, in the immediate aspect, is the finite world of nature, and man, who is far from being at one with his Father, is originally in an attitude of estrangement. The history of Christ is the visible reconciliation (Synthesis) between man and the Eternal. With the death of Christ this union, ceasing to be a mere fact, becomes a vital idea—the Spirit of God, which dwells in the Christian community."[1]

Doubtless, there is a Christian ring about all this. Nay, further, it is a statement of the Christian system, which in many points any orthodox Christian might endorse; but is it fruit which grows naturally on the tree of Hegel's Logic? Or is it only an attempt to apply his triadic law of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to a system of metaphysic and philosophy, which, on one cardinal point at least, is opposed to that

[1] Art. "Hegel," *Encyc. Brit.*

Logic? The harmony he sought to establish seems forced and unnatural, and those who after his death opposed his system, attacked it on the very ground of its pantheistic or atheistic tendency.[1]

Indeed, it seems a self-evident proposition, that the metaphysic which postulates nothing but an impersonal thought, as the Prius of all things, can never rise to the higher level of personality.

[1] Hegelianism, as a separate system of philosophy, did not long maintain its ground even in Germany, but its influence on philosophic thought has been deep and widespread both in Germany and outside.

"Fichte and Hegel," says Dr. Bain, in his summary of the theories of the soul, "being overmastered with the idea of unity, had to make a choice; and attaching themselves by preference to the dignified mental side, became Pantheists of an ideal school, resolving all existence into mind or ideas."—*Mind and Body*, p. 194.

SECTION II.

PERSONALITY CONSIDERED ON "A POSTERIORI" GROUNDS.

The *a posteriori* view—Mr. Illingworth on Personality—Inferences from this view of the subject, and Summary.

LET us now proceed to consider Personality from the *a posteriori* point of view.

We assume and start from the fact of human Personality. To deny this to be a fact is to deny that we are self-conscious agents, and in so doing we preclude ourselves from the capability and the possibility of proceeding any further with this investigation; for, if we are not certain of the fact of our personal existence as self-conscious spirits, then there is no other fact in the wide universe of which we can be certain. The admission of the fact of human Personality, then, forms the very foundation, on which all subsequent reasoning and conclusions must be based.

And here I would observe, in passing, that the

question how this human Personality came to be what it is, is a matter of indifference in our present investigation. It matters not whether it sprang into existence full-fledged, as it were, at the fiat of the Almighty, or whether it arrived at its present stage of development by a slow and gradual process of evolution. In either case, it is the product of a power, and the outcome of causes, which must be adequate to the total effect produced. But evolution, apart from the evolving force behind it, can produce nothing. It is only the name for a process or method of procedure.

But, if it be a matter of comparative indifference how the human Personality came to be what it is, the question, "what it is?" is one of paramount importance. Are we agreed on this point? Let us hear what some of the best authorities say.

Mr. Illingworth has made the subject of Personality in a special sense his own, and the following extracts from his book on *Divine Immanence* is much to the point:—

"Spirit, then, as we know it in our own personal experience, has two different relations to matter, that of transcendence and that of immanence. But though logically distinct, these two relations are not actually separate; they are two aspects

of one fact, two points of view from which the single action of our one personality may be regarded. As self-conscious, self-identical, self-determined, we possess qualities which transcend, or rise above the laws of matter; but we can only realize these qualities, and so become aware of them, by acting in the material world; while, conversely, material objects—our bodies and our works of art—could never possibly be regarded as expressions of spirit, if spirit were not at the same time recognized as distinct from its medium of manifestation."[1]

And again—

"Now we find, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which otherwise it so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-consciousness, or power of separating ourself as subject from ourself as object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call immaterial."

Such, according to Mr. Illingworth, is human Personality. It is a wonderful combination of spirit and matter, of subject and object—a combination in which, though there is mutual interaction, there is no confusion, in which the spirit,

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 68.

while it is immanent in matter, and in a measure dependent upon it, is yet able to rise above, and to act independently of it.

We have to remember, besides, that this human Personality is part of the natural order of things, the outcome of some force or power inherent and energetic in nature, and the highest product—the finished article—so far as our experience goes, which that force or power has produced.

Inferences and Summary.

What, then, are the inferences or conclusions to which this fact of human Personality points?

They would seem to be the following:—

1. On the principle, *Causa semper æquat effectum*, there must be behind nature a Power, call it what you will, that is adequate to the highest results produced, including the self-conscious personal spirit of man.

2. That, judging from analogy, this Power, not being of a lower order than the highest of its products, will be a Spirit similar to our own in kind, though infinitely superior in degree; a Spirit which is both immanent in Nature, and at the same time transcends Nature; a Person in Whom,

as in our own, both subject and object are combined, but not confused.

To quote Mr. Illingworth once more—

"He must be conceived as ever-present to sustain and animate the universe, which then becomes a living manifestation of Himself—no mere machine, or book, or picture, but a perpetually sounding voice."[1]

Summary.—The consideration of Personality, then, from the *a posteriori* point of view, points clearly and consistently to the existence of a Prius spiritual and personal, Who is immanent in Nature in such sense that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being," yet at the same time transcends Nature, and is not to be confounded with it. It is the view of the Psalmist: "The Lord sitteth above the water-flood: and the Lord remaineth a King for ever."

Reader, let me ask, did you ever grow a Trumpet Lily (*Lilium longiflorum*)? If not, let me recommend you to do so, for you do not know, until you try, how much pleasure it can give you. "Sermons in stones," says our great English Bard. "Consider the lilies," says the Prophet of Nazareth. And what a sermon does this exquisite flower

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 73.

preach me, with its trumpet tongue, its sublime yet silent eloquence! I seem to see in it a striking instance of Divine immanence in Nature. As I stand before it I feel bound as by a spell, in which admiration is mingled with reverential awe. Its graceful form and purity of tint, its boldness and symmetry of outline, its ravishing perfume and dignified repose, bespeak the presence of a Power before which I could fall down and worship. It seems as though God Himself were speaking to me through that flower, and revealing to me something of His ineffable beauty and loveliness. To entertain an impure thought, an unchaste desire, in the presence of that flower would surely be an act of sacrilege, a dishonour done to Him Who manifests Himself therein. I see in it a reflection of the Divine Being, which, while it ravishes my soul, begets in me the desire to know Him better, and possess Him in fuller measure.

SECTION III.

PERSONALITY IN THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF METAPHYSIC AND RELIGION.

Three propositions—

I. The Prius of all things is a Self-conscious personal Unity.

II. Self-manifesting by (*a*) Generation, (*b*) Creation, (*c*) Immanence, (*d*) Incarnation.

III. Self-reconciling.

First Proposition.—The Prius a Self-conscious Personal Unity.

Second Proposition.—The Christian Prius Self-manifesting by (*a*) Generation, (*b*) Creation—What is Life?—Mr. Spencer's definition—The birth of the Soul—Manifestation of the Prius by (*c*) Immanence—*Homò speculum Dei*—Manifestation of the Prius through (*d*) Incarnation—Not considered improbable in non-Christian systems—The Christian Incarnation—The argument for it.

Third Proposition.—The Christian Prius a Self-reconciling Unity—Dualism—Differences and their reconciliation—The mystery of sin—Hegel's triadic law illustrated in Christian Metaphysic—Reconciliation of wills through the Incarnation.

IN no respect, perhaps, is the difference between the various systems of secular and Christian Metaphysic more clearly defined and accentuated than in their respective treatment of the subject of Personality.

We have already seen how Personality is dealt with in some of the principal systems of secular Metaphysic. We now come to consider how it is dealt with in Christian Metaphysic.

By Christian Metaphysic, as distinguished from secular, I understand that Metaphysic, which forms the philosophic basis of the Christian Religion, and of which Christianity is the religious expression.

But what is Christian Metaphysic? It is almost needless to say, that for any authoritative statements in answer to this question we must have recourse to the sacred Records of the Old and New Testaments. And I venture to submit the three following propositions, as embodying the main doctrines and conclusions of Christian Metaphysic :—

PROPOSITIONS OF CHRISTIAN METAPHYSIC.

I. The Prius of all things is a self-conscious personal Unity.

II. Self-manifesting.

III. Self-reconciling.

Of course, it is needless to say, that these propositions do not admit of absolute proof. But there are two points, on which the reader has a right to demand the fullest satisfaction.

First, are they such as may rightly be called propositions of Christian Metaphysic? Do they, in the second place, afford a rational and probable theory, on which to account for the facts and phenomena of which we are conscious or sensible, either within or without us?

To afford satisfaction on these two points, therefore, will be my first endeavour. And we will take the propositions in the order in which they appear.

PROPOSITION I.—*The Christian Prius is a Self-conscious, Personal Unity.*

That the Christian Prius is consistently represented as a self-conscious Unity in the sacred Scriptures will, I imagine, be generally admitted. Both in the Old and New Testaments the fact is both repeatedly and variously asserted, as every child in a Sunday school would tell us. There is no need, therefore, for a long string of texts, and two will suffice.

Deut. vi. 4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God (= Jehovah, our Elohim) is One Lord (= Jehovah)."

Col. i. 17: "And He is before all things, and by Him all things consist."

Self-conscious.

Neither can it be necessary to show, that self-consciousness is an attribute of the Christian Prius; for passages without number could be quoted in which it is, either directly stated, or left to be inferred.

Creation, and especially the creation of man, is spoken of as the result of self-conscious action: "Let us make man." And again, St. Paul speaks of Him as "working all things after the counsel of His Own Will." (Eph. i. 11.)

Personality of the Prius.

If the Christian Prius be self-conscious, then Personality must also be attributed to Him, for self-consciousness is of the essence of Personality. But, if Personality be claimed as an attribute of the Prius, we must remember that it is in a different sense to that in which it is claimed for man.

Each man is individually a person. But the Divine Prius is not an individual Person, but a Trinity of Three distinct Persons. And He is One, only by virtue of the unity or union of these Three Persons in One. His Unity is not the

unity of a single individual, as in the case of man, but that of a community of Three Persons. Each of these Persons possesses the same attributes in equal measure, and it is the participation in common of these attributes in which the Unity of the Personal Prius consists. If I may be permitted, without irreverence, to borrow an illustration from the world of commerce, I would compare it to a company or society of three men, who unite to form a business firm for trade or manufacture, and in which they each place equal sums of money. The firm is one, but the partners are three. The firm is not a person, but each of the partners is. The firm possesses no personality, and yet, by virtue of the personality of the partners, it becomes invested with that attribute, and the firm is said to do things, as representing the unanimous consent and intentions of the partners.

So the Prius of Christian Metaphysic is a Unity, not by virtue of being One Person, but because each of the Three Persons is an equal sharer in the One Divine Substance which is common to them all.[1]

[1] "Each Person in the Blessed Trinity has the attributes of the Others, so that the distinctions of Persons whereby They be, in some incomprehensible way, distinguished from Each Other, coalesce in the Unity of the Godhead." (St. Aug., *De Trin.* lix.)

That this doctrine of the threefold Personality in the Unity of the Prius is mysterious we fully admit. This, however, is no argument against its truth and probability. For in the human Personality, regarded as a type of its Maker, we encounter the same, or a similar, difficulty. And, therefore, as St. Augustine points out, we ought not to question about Him, until we have first learned the mystery in ourselves.

"The *mind* itself and its *knowledge*, and *love* as the third, is a sort of image of the Trinity; and these three are one and one substance. Nor is the offspring less (than the parent), since the mind *knoweth* itself just as much as *it is;* nor the love less, since it *loveth* itself as much as it *knoweth*, and as much as *it is*." (Aug., *De Trin.*, I. ix. c. 4 & ff.)

The Names of God.

The very names by which the Divine Prius is revealed indicate the nature and attributes which are claimed for Him. Take, for example, the following:—

Elohim (Heb.).—This word is a plural in form, but is joined to verbs in the singular. As the first name of the Divine Prius, it asserts His Unity, and claims in His behalf, that He is the

only Source of all the forces and influences by which the Universe was first created, and is now governed, developed, and maintained.

Jehovah (or *Yahveh*), "He Who brings into existence."—This name denotes that the Divine Prius is the Self-Existent, the one and only source of being—the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Eternal One.[1]

El-Shaddai (Heb.).—El, which is usually translated "God," denotes primarily "might," or "power," or "force." The second name, Shaddai, indicates the nature of this power, which is not that of violence, but All-bountifulness and Love.[2] He is Almighty, but His Almightiness is of the

[1] Cf. Exod. iii. 14: "And God said unto Moses, 'I Am that I Am:' and He said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, 'I Am' (Ehyeh) hath sent me unto you." And Is. xlv. 6, "I Am, and there is none beside Me." See also Deut. vi. 4: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God (Jehovah our Elohim) is one Lord (Jehovah)." This latter passage claims on behalf of Jehovah that He, and He alone, is the One Absolute Uncaused God.

[2] "'Shaddai' primarily means 'breasted' or 'the breasted one,' from Heb. 'Shad' = breast, and especially a 'woman's breast.'"—Rev. A. Jukes, *Names of God*, p. 66.

"*Shaddai*," as one of the Divine titles, denoted the "Power" or "Shedder-forth," *i.e.* of blessings and fruits. The Sheddim, referred to as objects of idolatrous worship (Deut. xxxii. 17; and Ps. cvi. 37), were the many-breasted idols representing the genial powers of nature, the givers of rain, and pourers-forth of fruits and increase. See Parkhurst's *Hebrew Lexicon*, s. v. "Shaddai" and "Sheddim."

breast: that is, of self-sacrificing affection, giving and shedding itself for the good of others.

El Shaddai, then, reveals the Divine Prius under the attribute of Love. He Who is power and force; pure thought and intelligence; the Absolute, the Unconditioned Self-Existent One, is also Love. He is Power, Thought, Existence, rendered operative by Love. All life is the self-realization of the All-loving One. The Universe is the Self-manifestation of the Uncreated, instinct with His own attributes of power, intelligence, and love. And this name, El Shaddai, while it claims Love as the animating principle of the Prius, so also, by direct inference, it reveals Him in His Attribute of Paternity. He is the All-Father, and from Him all fatherhood is derived.[1]

But "will" also is the prerogative of a father; hence a further inference to be drawn from this name "El-Shaddai" is that the Divine Prius, beside embracing under His Personality the attributes of Power, and Pure Thought, of Self-Existence, of Love and Paternity, is also the source and seat

[1] Eph. iii. 15: Ἐξ οὗ πᾶσα πατριὰ ὀνομάζεται. See also Heb. xii. 9, where He is called "the Father of spirits;" and Ps. lxviii. 5: "Jah" is also "A Father of the fatherless;" and Is. lxiii. 16: "Doubtless Thou art our Father, though Abraham be ignorant of us."

of Sovereign Will. Indeed, a moment's reflection will show us, that the former necessarily involve the latter. It is impossible to conceive of One Who is power and thought and love who is not also possessed of will.[1]

The following, then, to speak briefly, is the position assumed by Christian Metaphysic with regard to its Divine Prius :—

1. It involves Personality as its essential principle and characteristic.

2. This Personality is not simple, but threefold. It is that of a Trinity of Persons.

3. These Three Persons are so intimately united that they form but One Being, Who is the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Uncaused Cause of all things.

Bearing in mind, then, how, according to the teaching of Christian Metaphysic, Personality forms an essential principle of the Prius, let us pass on to the consideration of our second proposition.

[1] We see how Schopenhauer's contention, that "Will is Lord of all," is the enunciation of a great truth, which only becomes reconciled with reason under its treatment by Christian Metaphysic.

PROPOSITION II.—*The Christian Prius is Self-manifesting.*

We are not left in any doubt that Christianity does claim this proposition to be true. And, indeed, a moment's reflection will show, that, unless Nature and the Universe be illusions, it follows, as a necessary corollary from the first Proposition, that the Prius of all things is a personal Unity.

In various ways has this Self-manifestation been going forward; but we shall find, I believe, that most, if not all of them, may be arranged under one or other of the following heads:—

(*a*) Generation.

(*b*) Creation.

(*c*) Immanence and Effusion.

(*d*) Incarnation.

Let us consider them in this order, still remembering, that my object is, not to prove them to be true, which under the circumstances is impossible, but only to show that they are concepts and doctrines of Christian Metaphysic, which are either explicitly, or implicitly contained in the Christian sacred writings.

(*a*) *First Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: by Generation.*

From all eternity the Prius adopted this method of Self-manifestation. The very mystery of the Threefold Personality involves it. For the second Person is represented as occupying the relation of a Son to the First Person. St. Paul, the great exponent of Christian Metaphysic, speaks of the Second Person as "the first-born of all creation."[1] And the First Person he calls the Father, because "from Him every family in heaven and earth is named.[2]

Then from the First and Second Persons, Co-equal[3] and Consubstantial, there proceeds the Spirit, which is shared in common by them both, the Third Person of the Trinity—the Holy Ghost.[4]

[1] Col. i. 15: Πρωτοτόκος πάσης κτίσεως.

[2] Ἐξ οὗ πασὰ πατρία ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ὀνομάζεται. Lit. "all-fatherhood."

[3] Col. i. 19: Πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα.

[4] See for the further enunciation of these doctrines the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. From the Eternal generation of the Second Person there follows the Eternal procession of the Third. The view held by the Bishops and Doctors who drew up these Creeds was "that the Father is the Head and Fountain of Deity (Πηγὴ Θεοτήτος), from Whom the Son and Holy Spirit are from all eternity derived, but so derived as not to be divided from the Father; but they are in the Father and the Father in Them by a certain περιχώρησις or inhabitation."—Bp. Browne, *Thirty-Nine Art.*, p. 58.

But this aspect of our subject falls rather within the domain of Theology, and therefore I will not dwell upon it, further than to point out its important bearing on those methods of Self-manifestation which follow. It is "in Him"[1] and "through Him"[2] that the Prius, as Father, creates; it is by His Spirit that He is immanent throughout the Universe.

In his paper on "The Evidences of Design in Nature," the late Mr. G. J. Romanes quoted with manifest approval extracts from the Rev. Aubrey Moore's Essay in *Lux Mundi*. Amongst them is the following :—

"It seems as if, in the providence of God, the mission of modern science was to bring home to our unmetaphysical ways of thinking the great truth of the Divine immanence in creation."

(*b*) *Second Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: by Creation.*

That many of the statements in the Christian Records, which describe the Prius as Self-manifesting in creation, are couched in anthropomorphic language need not surprise us, when we remember they were intended to convey abstract

[1] Col. i. 16. [2] Heb. i. 2.

ideas to people in an early stage of civilization and intellectual development. In no other way could those ideas have been rendered intelligible. And we find the same method adopted in the heathen mythologies, and especially in the polytheism of ancient Greece and Rome. But while it need not surprise us, it is none the less important to make due allowance for it. Moreover, as a matter of fact, we do find abundant warnings, even in the Jewish and Christian Records themselves, against errors and misconceptions, which might arise from anthropomorphic language and modes of thought.

The very prohibition of idolatry in the Second Commandment of the Decalogue is a case in point. God is a Spirit; nor must we conceive of Him as comparable to any earthly similitude. And this applies not only to outward form, but to inward thought and intelligence. "For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts."[1]

And St. Paul, when reasoning with the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers at Athens, warned them against the misconception of supposing that

[1] Isa. lv. 9.

the Maker of all things "dwells in temples made with hands," or "is like unto gold or silver or stone, graven by art and device of man."[1]

If this means anything, it means that in our conception of the Christian Prius and His method of Self-manifestation by Creation, we must rise above, and free ourselves from anthropomorphism. He is the Great Poet, and the Universe is His poem. But He writes not with pen and ink. He carves not with chisel and hammer. Nature is the canvas, on which He is for ever depicting Himself, but it is with no human pencil that He paints.

The following I venture humbly to submit as the true position :—

1. All life proceeds from and is a manifestation of the Prius. If there be a Prius, this is an axiomatic truth, for there is no other source from which life can spring. If there be no Prius, then chance, or necessity, are the only alternatives.

2. But what is Life? According to Mr. Spencer, it is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."[2] And he adds, that we may consider the internal relations

[1] Acts xvii. 24, 29.

[2] *Psychology*, p. 374.

as "simultaneous and successive changes," and the connection between them as "a correspondence." This means that internal phenomena answer to external phenomena.

I humbly submit, that this so-called definition of Life is no definition at all; because it leaves the question of what Life is in itself untouched, and gives us only a generalized expression of the forms in which Life is manifested to us. Is, then, a definition of Life possible? I do not think it is, beyond saying it is "the *power* to produce all its manifestations." But we must not confound what a thing is in its essence with what it can produce, or become. A potter can make pots but pots don't make a potter. The pots are the product of his skill, but his wares are entirely distinct from it.

Life, then, I submit, is not "adjustment" or "correspondence," but the power under suitable conditions to produce them; and for this power, as I have endeavoured to show, we must go back to the Personal Prius, seeing that there is no other source whence it can be derived.

But life is more than this. It is the power to assimilate for self-support; to receive impressions, and respond to stimulants from its

environment; to produce an internal image, or reflexion, answering to external phenomena, whether physical or spiritual. And the experiential result of all this is the production of interior psychical relations, corresponding to outer relations, and forming the psychical content of each stage in the progress of vital development.

But Life is more even than this: it is the power, not only to receive and respond to impressions and impulses from without, and so to beget by experience inner relations corresponding to outer relations; it is the power to register, to collect, to store up, and then finally to transmit all accumulated experiences and relations to successors by the laws of generation and heredity. Take a young mole and a young squirrel as soon as they are born, keep them in a cage till they are fully grown, and then turn them loose. The mole will quickly hide itself in the ground, and the squirrel will run up the nearest tree. And we call this instinct. It is really nothing but inherited physical and psychical faculty.

I submit, then, that Life is not all what Mr. Spencer conceives it to be, an effect to be accounted for by the experience of purely

material and physical forces; but a power proceeding from the Self-manifesting Prius; a power—

1. To assimilate for self-support;

2. To receive, reflect and respond to impressions and stimulants from the environment;

3. To deal with them, and translate them into mental ideas and concepts, thus establishing a system of internal psychical relations corresponding to external relations;

4. To register and accumulate these relations;

5. To transmit them to successors by the laws of generation and heredity, whereby the psychical content goes on continuously increasing *pari passu* with each higher development of the vital organism.

It is thus, I venture to think, we may give a rational account of the phenomena of Life from its lowest to its highest stage of progress—from the amæba to the man—and whether regarded from a physiological or psychical point of view.

Regarded in this light, further consideration will show that all Life is in a double sense a manifestation of the Prius: first, in respect to its source; second, in respect to its development.

Those who are acquainted with Mr. Spencer's *Psychology* are aware, that on no point does he

insist with greater force and frequency than the fact that there is a perfect correspondence or adjustment between our inner and outer relations. "Every form of intelligence," he says, "is in essence an adjustment of inner to outer relations."[1]

This must mean one of two things, either our inner relations—*i.e.* our whole psychical content—are adjusted to, and so in a great measure an effect produced by, our outer relations; or our outer relations—*i.e.* our whole environment, with all its phenomena, whether material or spiritual—are adjusted to, and influenced by our inner relations.

The latter supposition is manifestly absurd, therefore the first must be true. This means in effect, that our inner relations are really the product, as regards their form, disposition and development, of those outer relations, both material and spiritual, which constitute our environment. But what is our environment? It is the world of Nature, it is the boundless Universe, which is again only the Self-manifestation of the Prius.

And so it appears, that Life, not only in its origin, but in every successive stage of its development, is the product and creation of the

[1] *Psychology*, p. 486.

Self-manifesting Prius. Each individual concrete form of life, and each increment in the content of life, whether physical or psychical, represents a further adjustment and correspondence of inner to outer relations. And each manifestation received and appropriated prepares the way for further manifestations in succeeding generations. But the power to adjust and correspond, to establish internal relations answering to external, to accumulate experiences, and transmit them by generation and heredity,—all these must be regarded as the product and creation, so to speak, of the One and only efficient Cause, the Self-manifesting Prius.[1]

The Birth of the Soul.

The account of the creation of the soul of man given us in Genesis is evidently couched in anthropomorphic language, which calls for allowance and interpretation. And in all the ranks of animal life inferior to man the psychical development,

[1] Of course, every manifestation of the Prius must be a matter of experience by the vital organism, for in no other way can they be received and appropriated. In this sense there is truth in Mr. Spencer's Experience Hypothesis. But experience is not, as he appears to regard it, an efficient cause, but only the application of it.

effected through the manifestation of the Prius, only reaches the stage of consciousness; but in man it has advanced a step further, to the stage of self-consciousness. It is at this point, when the Ego becomes differentiated from the non-Ego, when the will assumes the supremacy and control over all the other elements of the psychical content, such as feeling, thought, memory, etc., that the spirit of man becomes a living soul, a being endowed with individual personality, formed through the Self-manifestation of the Prius in the image and likeness of the Prius Himself. And this final result is well expressed, as it seems to me, by Professor Wundt under the heading of "The Ego and Personality." [1]

"As the Ego is the will in its distinction from the rest of conscious content, so Personality is the Ego reunited in the manifold of this content, and thereby raised to the stage of self-consciousness."

May it not be thus that the claims of Science and Revelation are to be reconciled? And not of Science only, but of Metaphysic also. In the language of Metaphysic we say the human Personality is a Self-manifestation of the personal

[1] *Principles of Morality*, p. 21.

Prius ; in the language of Scripture we say, " God made man in His own Image," " He breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." If Metaphysic and Science can teach us, as doubtless they can, something of the method adopted by the First Great Cause in the production and development of Life, should we not be thankful for their help in our quest after the truth ?

(*c*) *Third Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius : by Immanence and Effusion.*

As this branch of our subject has already been dealt with at considerable length, and in a very convincing manner by the Rev. J. R. Illingworth in his book on Divine Immanence, it does not seem necessary for me to go over the same ground in detail. I would only point out, that, while in Christian Metaphysic the Self-manifestation of the Prius by Creation is regarded as the work of the Second Person of the Trinity, Self-manifestation by Effusion and Immanence is the work of the Third Person—the Spirit which proceeds from the First and Second.

There are two main aspects under which the subject may be regarded ; though some persons

might, perhaps, be disposed to regard them as one—

(*a*) Immanence in Nature;

(*b*) Immanence in Man.

The influence of Nature—that is, of the material Universe—upon the mind and soul of man is universally acknowledged. The literature of all nations, since the time they possessed a literature, bears witness to it. Even the lowest and most degraded forms of religion and mythology are but the expression of a consciousness of something in Nature which is yet above Nature.[1] And though men have put different interpretations on their experience of this influence, and framed different systems of religion and philosophy to explain it, still "beneath them all, that experience remains; a sense, in the presence of Nature, of contact with something spiritual; a sense of affinity, or kinship, as the Neo-platonists described it, with the material world, implying spirituality within or behind it." [2]

[1] "Sun-myths, star-myths, myths of the mountains and the rivers and the trees lie at the root, as we now know so well, of all early religion. . . . We have long outgrown mythology, and are intolerant of doubtful logic, but the religious influence of external nature is as strong upon us as it ever was, possibly even stronger than in some bygone times."—*Divine Immanence*, p. 22.

[2] *Divine Immanence*, p. 50.

And what has been the result so far as man is concerned? the birth of what, to use a single term embracing sentiment and emotion, we call the religious instinct. Of all created forms of life, man is the only one who possesses it. He alone is capable of it, and it is that, which differentiates him most completely from all other and lower orders of creation. This religious instinct forms part of my psychical equipment. It is one of my spiritual assets. I cannot deny it, for it is a matter of daily and universal experience. It is one of my inner relations; but my inner relations, to use the language and reasoning of Mr. Spencer, are only the counterpart of my outer relations, and without the latter the former cannot exist. And what is the inference from this?

I conclude that my religious instinct demands both for its existence and satisfaction the presence in Nature, and the whole Universe, of a Spirit answering to my spirit, immanent in matter yet transcending matter, the effluence and Self-manifestation of the Prius.

Immanence in Man. Homo Speculum Dei.

But, bearing in mind the unity of Nature and the solidarity of all life, we perceive that man is part of Nature. Therefore in him, too, we should expect to find the immanence of the same Spirit which indwells and animates Nature.

Nor shall we be disappointed. The religious instinct testifies to the presence in Nature of a spiritual Influence. But my religious instinct is only a part of my psychical content and equipment. There are other faculties and functions of an instinctive nature, of the reality of which I am as conscious and assured as I am of my religious instinct. There is the perception and apperception of beauty; for example, of truth and justice and love. However I came by them, it is vain to tell me I do not possess them, or that they are the illusive fictions of my imagination. Not only are they co-efficients, factors, attributes of that entity, which for convenience I call my soul, but they are indices of a something behind them which is real and spiritual. And if my religious instinct bears witness to the existence of the Prius, manifesting Himself through

immanence in Nature, do not these reveal to me something of His character?

It is Nature, or rather the Spirit which animates Nature, which gives us our first and most trustworthy lessons in art, and begets in us the instinctive perception and love of the beautiful. It is the study of the mathematical axioms and laws of matter and space, which reveal to us the foundation stones on which the whole edifice of truth and justice is erected. It is Nature which imparts to all things living their first lessons in love; and the function of the human soul is to translate the material impress into the spiritual idea or concept. But life itself is the immanation of the Spirit of the Prius, and the soul of man is the mirror of God, *Speculum Dei*, in which He causes Himself to be reflected; the plastic wax which received the impress of His Image. My innate sense of the beautiful bespeaks Him to be the source of beauty. My consciousness of truth and justice tells me that He is true and just; my conscience, with its categorical imperative of duty, that He is holy; my sentiment of affection, that love is His abiding and essential attribute.

We must not suppose, however, that the influence of the Self-manifesting Prius on man is only

experienced indirectly through immanence in Nature. So soon as the spirit of man, through the attainment of self-consciousness, arrived at the stage of personality, it became thenceforth a fitting recipient of more direct manifestation. How else shall we account for the appearance from time to time, and in various lands, of those great ones of the earth, such as Socrates, and Plato, and Buddha; of poets and philosophers, who have risen like meteors in a midnight sky, and astonished and enlightened the world by their holy lives, their devout aspirations, their deep and prophetic insight into truth? These, surely, were inspired men; and what could be the source of their inspiration but the Spirit of the Prius immanent both in Nature and in man?

"Thus God's immanence in Nature," says Mr. Illingworth, "we may reasonably assert, reappears as inspiration in man. Meanwhile, our spiritual character reacts upon the material instrument of its realization, moulding the brain and nervous system, and thence the entire bodily organism, into gradual accordance with itself, till the expression of the eye, the lines of the face, the tones of the voice, the touch of the hand, the movements, and manners, and gracious demeanour, all reveal with increasing clearness the *nature* of the Spirit

which has made them what they are. Thus the interior beauty of holiness comes by degrees to be a visible thing; and through His action on our spirit, God is made manifest in our flesh."[1]

And it is not only in life that we have evidence of the transforming influence of the Divine Spirit immanent in the body. I doubt not that some at least of my readers have been privileged to behold that wonderful transfiguration which sometimes takes place at the moment of death. The face of the humble servant of Jesus becomes for a moment suffused with an unearthly glory, which ere now has wrung from the sorrowing bystanders the exclamation, "How beautiful! O death, where is thy sting?" It is the Christian Euthanasia—the kiss of Psyche—with which she bids adieu for a while to her frail earthly comrade; and, as she does so, whispers in the ear, "See what glory awaits us in the far-off land."

But religion is the people's Metaphysic, and pre-eminently is this true in the case before us. The Christian Religion, including in the term the Jewish Dispensation, which was preparatory to it, is the practical exemplification of the metaphysical law of a Prius self-manifesting through effusion

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 76.

and immanence. And it is hardly too much to say, that the whole Christian system is based on the acknowledgment of this principle. I scarcely need remind my reader how in the Old Testament the immanence of the Spirit of God in man is claimed, or inferred, over and over again. "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me. Cast me not away from Thy presence, and take not Thy Holy Spirit from me." Such was the prayer of the Psalmist; while the Prophets claimed to speak not their own words, to give utterance, not to their own thoughts, but to those of the Spirit which inspired them: "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me."[1] Such is ever the justification of the message they delivered. Nor was this all. These same holy men, who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," foretold a fuller effluence of the same Spirit in the future: "I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh:"[2] and a more complete and intimate immanence, "and I will walk among you, and will be your God."[3]

All these promises and predictions the Christian holds to have been fulfilled, or, at least, the means

[1] Isa. lxi. 1. [2] Joel ii. 28.
[3] Lev. xxvi. 12, and Jer. xxxi. 33.

for their fulfilment provided, in the Christian Religion, which may truly be described as a Dispensation of the Spirit. To pursue the subject further in this direction would bring me into the domain proper to Theology. What I have said will be sufficient, I imagine, to show the consistence and harmony between Christian Metaphysic and the Christian Religion in respect to immanence and effusion as modes of Self-manifestation of the Prius.

(*d*) *Third Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: through Incarnation.*

We have considered the Second Proposition of Christian Metaphysic—that the Prius of all things is a self-manifesting personal Unity—as realized by Generation, by Creation, by Effusion, and Immanence. We come now to the fourth and last method, that of Incarnation, where by Incarnation we mean the Christian view and presentation of it.

I would observe, then, in the first place, that the subject of Incarnation is not one peculiar to Christianity. The ancient Mythologies and Religions of India, Greece, and Rome, not to mention other countries, may be said to abound in incarnations. For example, Hinduism, the most ancient religion of which we have any historic records,

claims no less than ten incarnations of Vishnu, of which the two most important are those of Râma and Krishna;[1] while, to come down to modern times, we read only the other day of the "living god" of Urga, who is to the millions of Chinese and Mongolian Buddhists what the Dalai Lama is to the Buddhists in that part of the world.[2]

All these many examples of so-called incarnation at least show that there is nothing in the idea abhorrent to the human mind, on the score of being intrinsically improbable or impossible.

[1] *Christianity and Hinduism*, by Bishop Caldwell.

[2] See letter from a correspondent of the *Standard*, which appeared Nov. 15, 1901. I give the following extracts from this interesting letter:—

"In the flesh he is a young man under thirty, and was in a house which is an exact replica of the Russian Consulate-General. His personification of a deity is chiefly confined to religious occasions and his public life. In private he is of the world, worldly. . . . I was fortunate enough to see this extraordinary personage under conditions not easily forgotten. Outside one of the beautiful Buddhist temples, in a carefully guarded enclosure, was pitched a semicircle of tents. The central one, resplendent with yellow silks and gold embroidery, with huge yellow silk umbrellas and cushions to match, contained the throne of the living god. On either hand, and surrounding him, were crowds of Lamas, priests, Mongol princes, and Ambans. . . . Upon entering the ring, each pair of wrestlers prance up with curious movements of the arms and legs to the immediate presence of the 'living god,' before whom they kowtow, falling on their knees and striking the ground repeatedly with their foreheads."

On the contrary, we are led to infer that, where there is a belief in the supernatural, an incarnation of it appears reasonable, possible, and probable. Of course, a belief in the probability and possibility of an event, and the expectation that it will happen, affords no proof that it has happened. But neither, on the other hand, because many incarnations are held to be spurious and untrue, are we justified in concluding that all incarnations, or any one in particular, are false and therefore to be rejected. Neither are we justified in discrediting incarnation on the ground of its being miraculous and contrary to experience. Is nothing to happen that is contrary to our limited experience? Is it not true, that in the evolution and development of any subject every step is necessarily contrary to experience? If nothing were to happen but what accords with our very limited experience in the past, there would at once be a stop put to all progress in the future. A miracle, if we analyze the word, is merely something to be wondered at, as being unusual in the ordinary course of Nature. And certainly no miracle can happen without an adequate cause. But to argue from this, that a miracle is impossible is tantamount to saying that there is no

Supernatural, no Power higher than Nature herself. Nature, indeed, cannot produce a miracle in the ordinary sense of the word, as something contrary to Nature. But if there be a Supernatural, *i.e.* a Power working according to some higher law and for a higher end, then an event which appears miraculous may in reality not be so, because it is in accordance with the higher law, and brought about for the attainment of the higher end.

And this, as it appears to me, is precisely the position of the Incarnation in the Christian system of Metaphysic and Religion. It is but a further development of a principle, which all along had been in operation, namely, the Self-manifestation of the Prius. If that principle be true, if the Prius has been manifesting Himself first in Creation (Nature), and then in Effusion and Immanence, is there anything improbable or impossible in the supposition, that He would make a further and more direct manifestation of Himself by Incarnation? Nay, should we not rather expect it?

There is another point on which a few words may not be out of place here. Is the Incarnation to be merely regarded as the climax of the Self-manifestation of the Personal Prius in matter

through Immanence?[1] In a certain sense this is true, and theologians will not be at a loss for passages which seem to support such a contention.[2] Still, on the whole, it seems more fitting to regard Self-manifestation through Incarnation as differing, not only in degree, but in kind. Immanence and Effusion are the special function and work of the Divine Spirit. But Manifestation through Incarnation, though effected by the co-operation of the same Spirit, is specially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, the Word or Expression of the First. He who could say "I and the Father are One" must needs be something more than a human person in whom the Spirit is immanent, in however high a degree. And, therefore, the Christian Incarnation, while we may regard it as a prolation and further development of the metaphysical law of a Self-manifesting Prius, should not, I think, be confused with Immanence and Effusion. That the Prius

[1] "In proportion as we are enabled to recognize this progressive manifestation of God in matter, we are prepared to find it culminate in His actual Incarnation, the climax of His Incarnation in the world."—Illingworth's *Divine Immanence*, p. 77.

[2] As, for example, St. Luke i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee;" St. Matt. iii. 16, the descent of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at His Baptism by John; and St. John iii. 34, "God giveth not the Spirit by measure *unto Him.*"

has manifested Himself in Nature, and in man as part of Nature, is the contention of Christian Metaphysic and Philosophy. That this Self-manifestation was carried to a higher stage by Spiritual Immanence both indirect and direct has ever been both the belief and teaching of the Jewish and Christian Religions. But that this latter stage was all that was possible, and all that was required to satisfy the religious instincts and aspirations of mankind, none, I imagine, would dare to assert. Moreover, it is a fact of some significance that the further and fuller manifestation of the Prius was, like Effusion and Immanence, the subject of the clearest prediction. "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son:" so spake Isaiah hundreds of years before. And Jeremiah, foretelling the advent of "the Branch" which should grow out of the stem of David, went so far as to give Him a Name, "The Lord, our Righteousness." And these predictions, apart altogether from the question of their fulfilment, were, we must all admit, of an astonishing character, unparalleled in the history of all previous or subsequent literature. They led men to expect, not merely a fuller effusion of the Spirit, but a veritable Incarnation of God. But each and every incarnation

must stand or fall by its own intrinsic merits; that is, according as it can satisfy the demands of reason and congruity. And the question to be settled is this, "Was the Christian Incarnation, when, and in the manner in which it is said to have taken place, of such a nature as to satisfy those expectations which previous predictions had led men to entertain? Was it, both in its character and its consequences, a true manifestation of that Being, Who all along had been disclosing Himself in Nature and in man?

Whether, or not, this was the case, it is not for me to attempt even to prove. I would only point out that they are real questions, which every thoughtful man is bound to face and answer for himself. In the words of Bishop Caldwell,[1] he has to consider—

"Whether the purpose for which God became man, namely, to furnish men with a pattern of moral excellence, and to reconcile sinful men to the holy and blessed God, was not a purpose worthy of a Divine Incarnation. Whether the life and doctrines and death of Christ, or the influence of them upon Christians, has not, as a matter of historical fact, been the origin of all that

[1] *Christianity and Hinduism*, p. 47.

is most elevated in the moral and spiritual life of Christendom, and of all that has rendered Christendom the source of moral and spiritual life to the rest of the world. And, lastly, whether it would not be unreasonable and unscientific to attribute results so divine to anything less than a Divine Cause."

PROPOSITION III.—*The Christian Prius a Self-reconciling Unity.*

The Third Proposition of Christian Metaphysic, that the Personal Prius is also a Self-reconciling Unity, is really a conclusion which follows necessarily from the First and Second Propositions. For, if it be granted that there is a Personal Prius, Who manifests Himself in nature, through variety and difference, then, in case that variety and difference issue in antagonism and hostility, the Prius must also be Self-reconciling. The contrary supposition would be inconsistent with our First Proposition, and would be tantamount to a practical denial of the supremacy of the Prius.

In the dualistic creed of Zoroaster the existence of differences and antagonisms received a different explanation. From the beginning there existed two Principles, Ormuzd, who represented the power of good, and Ahriman that of evil. Thus evil is

presupposed from all eternity.[1] But a metaphysical dualism of this kind has long been abandoned. And even the Parsees, whom we may regard as the lineal descendants and representatives of the Zoroastrian faith, though they still acknowledge Zoroaster as their Prophet, have abandoned his dualistic doctrine for pure Monotheism.

Though the powers of Nature sometimes seem not only diverse, but hostile, sometimes benevolent, and sometimes malefic, we still believe that she is one, and that all her energies proceed from one and the same source. If a frost comes in May and cuts off all the blossoms; if some mighty river overflows its banks and spreads devastation and death far and wide, we do not attribute these catastrophes to an evil principle in Nature wilfully counteracting the principle of good, but rather to the infinite variety in the Self-manifestation of the One Creative Prius.

The existence of differences and their reconciliation is, indeed, the one great problem which

[1] "Both Principles possess creative power, which manifests itself in the one positively, and in the other negatively. Ormuzd is light and life, and all that is pure and good—in the ethical world, law, order, and truth; his antithesis is darkness, filth, death, all that is evil in the world, lawlessness and lies."—*Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Zoroaster."

Metaphysic and Philosophy has to solve. Differences exist on all sides of us in the material, moral, and spiritual worlds. The whole Universe may be said to be made up of differences.[1] But when we speak of differences and their reconciliation, it is essential to remember that differences are of many kinds, and arise from several causes.

Differences.

Assuming a Prius manifesting Himself by creation, it is evident that, unless only one kind of thing be created, in which case it could not be a true manifestation of an infinite Creator, there must be endless variety—that is, difference in the things created. But all differences do not imply antagonism. Sometimes the difference is only one of contrast or degree; as, for example, the contrast between long and short, thick and thin, rough and smooth. In such cases the difference is no more than the absence of a quality in one thing, which is present in another.

[1] In the Hegelian Logic, Self-consciousness is regarded as "a unity which realizes itself through difference and the reconciliation of difference—as, in fact, an organic unity of elements, which exist only as they pass into each other." I have already pointed out some of the flaws and inconsistencies, as they seem to me, at least, which mar the Hegelian system.

But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that beside differences of contrast and negation, there are others which are far more. There are differences which seem to contain the element of antagonism and hostility. Thus acids and alkalis are mutually destructive. The forces of Nature are frequently opposed. Animal and vegetable life alike, from beginning to end, is a struggle between vital and physical force, and death is the triumph of the latter over the former.

So, too, when we ascend to the higher range of moral and spiritual life, we meet with differences, which seem to imply a radical and essential antagonism.

Such differences as these present a far greater difficulty, even if they are not entirely beyond the reach of solution by ourselves. That powers of good and evil do exist side by side, that they are both energetic and mutually hostile, are facts of daily experience. *Primâ facie*, it would appear impossible to reconcile them with the existence of a Prius Who is One, Supreme, and Good. How are we to explain this? Or must we give up the problem in despair?

The opinion of some Moralists and Theologians who have given much thought to this subject, and

whose conclusions, therefore, are entitled to our respectful consideration, is that we must seek the solution in the action and effect of Free-will. Such, I believe, was the opinion of the late Dr. Liddon. The argument in its metaphysical and religious aspect is somewhat as follows :—

God is a free Agent—that is, Free-will is one of His essential attributes. If, then, He chose to manifest Himself, or, as the Scripture expresses it, to make man in His Own Image and likeness, man also must possess a Free-will. If he does not, then it is evident that any service or worship he might render would be a matter of compulsion, in which free will and voluntary surrender would have no part. Such service, therefore, would have no moral value. God will not be served by compulsion, but by love. But Free-will means the power to obey or refuse to obey impulses, and impulses may arise founded on ignorance and appealing to a narrow and selfish egoism. If, then, these be listened to and obeyed, the phenomena of opposing wills comes in sight. The Free-will of man may oppose and rebel against the Free-will of God, the result of which is sin, with all its evil consequences.

Similarly Professor Wundt, in discussing the

question of immorality, which is really the same as sin, makes it to consist in the perversion of the will, caused by a narrow and ignorant egoism: "The ultimate spring of immorality is egoism." And he adds—

"The conflict of good and evil is just this strife between wills. Since the empirical social will is finite and liable to error, the ultimate solution of this conflict is to be found only in an idea of reason, which makes the infinite series of will-forms terminate in a Supreme Will, phenomenally manifest in the individual consciousness, as the imperative of the moral idea, in the State and in society as the Spirit of History, and in the religious conception of the world as the Divine Idea." [1]

I quote these words of Professor Wundt, not because I think his ethical system altogether sound and convincing, but because they show that in his opinion too, as an independent Moralist, and not as a Christian Advocate, the essential nature of sin is to be sought and found in the antagonism between the different forms of Free-will. If this be so, then the conclusion is obvious. The triumph of good over evil is only to be secured by the reconciliation of all antagonistic will-forms with the Supreme Will which "in the

[1] *Ethics*, p. 112.

religious conception of the world is the Divine Idea."

That sin is a perversion of the will, leading to overt acts of rebellion and disobedience, seems to admit of little doubt; whether the above theory offers a true explanation of the manner in which that perversion is brought about is another question. At any rate, the only other hypothesis would seem to be that of the co-existence of a power, or principle, of evil together with that of good, which contravenes the unity and supremacy of a personal Prius.

If, on the other hand, this be the true solution of the origin and existence of evil, then the "difference" of good and evil becomes explicable. We may regard it as illustrating the Second Proposition of Christian Metaphysic; namely, that the Prius is self-manifesting through differences.

Nor is this all that may be said of it. The Third Proposition defines the Prius as Self-reconciling, which is really a necessary consequent or corollary from the First. For the continued and permanent existence of hostile differences would be incompatible with the existence of a Prius which is One and Supreme. And if all differences are to be reconciled (by the Prius), then,

above all others, the hostile difference between good and evil, by bringing all antagonistic will-forms into harmony with the One Supreme Will of the Prius. And here Hegel's triadic law of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis finds a cardinal illustration. The Divine Will is the Thesis, the antagonistic will of the creature is the Antithesis, and the harmonizing of the two is the Synthesis.[1]

Recalling, then, the fact that Religion is the people's Metaphysic, and that no Religion can be true which is not also the expression of a true Metaphysic, it remains for me to show two things:—

First, that the principle of a Personal Prius manifesting Himself through differences and their reconciliation is a doctrine of the Christian Religion.

Second, that Christianity is a religious system which provides for the exercise and application of this principle: that, concretely, sin, and the

[1] "Three elements—a notion, its opposite or contradictory, and that which embraces or reconciles the two, or, in other words, a thesis, an anthithesis, and the synthesis—represent a complete act of logic, or one movement of dialectic. And on the type of this environment Hegel undertook to explain the entire course and action of thought in its efforts to comprehend the Universe."—*Handbook of Biography*, Art. "Hegel."

difference between good and evil, arising from the antagonism of a perverted free-will in the creature and person of man to the Supreme Will of the Creator, is reconciled through the Incarnation of the Son, or Word of God, in the Person of Jesus Christ.[1]

Of all the writings of the New Testament, it will, I think, be admitted that none display so clear an insight into what may be called the metaphysical side or aspect of Christianity as those of St. Paul and St. John. St. Paul, indeed, may truly be called the great exponent of Christian Metaphysic. To these, therefore, let us have recourse, in order to ascertain what is Christian doctrine on this subject of reconciliation.

St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Colossians, writes as follows:—

"For it was the good pleasure (of the Father) that in Him should all the fulness dwell;[2] and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His

[1] To express the above in terms of the Hegelian Formula—the Supreme Will of the Personal Prius is the Thesis, the perverted will of the human personality is the Antithesis, and the Person of the Incarnate Word is the Divine Synthesis.

[2] Or, "for the whole fulness of God was pleased to dwell in Him."—R.V., margin.

Cross ; through Him, I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens." (Col. i. 19, 20.)[1]

Writing to the Corinthians, he says—

"To wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world (Cosmos) unto Himself." (2 Cor. v. 19.)

And again, in his first Epistle we find the same doctrine enunciated :—

"For He must reign until He hath put all His enemies under His feet. The last enemy that shall be abolished is death. . . . And when all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv. 25, 26, 28.)[2]

[1] This passage, taken in connection with the previous context, especially verses 15–17, is all the more significant, because St. Paul's object was to define the Christian doctrine of the Universe, of creation and reconciliation, as against the metaphysical speculations of the Gnostics, some of whom, where Persian influences predominated, held the doctrine of two separate and antagonistic Principles of Good and Evil, and others traced the origin of evil to matter.

[2] See also Ephes. ii. 16 : "And that He might reconcile both unto God in one body through the Cross," where Bishop Ellicott has the following note : "This brings out the profound idea, which so especially characterizes these Epistles, of a primæval unity of all created beings in Christ, marred and broken by sin, and restored by His manifestation in human flesh."—*Commentary for English Readers.*

In his Epistle to the Romans (viii. 19–22) he speaks of the whole creation[1] groaning and travailing in pain together, because in pursuance of the sovereign purpose of God it has been subject to vanity. That purpose, however, he tells us, is not yet worked out. It is a purpose in which there is hope and earnest expectation; because Creation shall finally be delivered from that bondage of corruption under which for the present it groans and travails "into the glory of the liberty of the children of God."

The Apostle and Evangelist St. John records a prayer offered by Jesus Christ to God, Whom He called His Heavenly Father, in which the following significant petition occurs: "That they may be one, even as We are One: I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in One." (St. John xvii. 22, 23.)

Now, the foregoing passages taken together clearly show, I think, two things:

1. That the Christian Religion, regarded under its metaphysical aspect, involves the principle of a Personal Prius manifesting Himself through differences and the reconciliation of them.

[1] V. 19: ἡ Κτίσις = "the whole world of Nature, animate and inanimate."—Bp. Ellicott.

2. That this reconciliation is claimed to be effected through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

He is the Divine Synthesis in Whom Thesis and Antithesis are reconciled. And He is so, because "in Him dwelleth all the fulness (*plerōma*) of the Godhead bodily," *i.e.* the essential nature, comprising all the attributes of God. (Col. ii. 9.)

Moreover, it will appear on further investigation that the reconciliation effected through the Incarnation consists mainly in the harmonizing of all antagonistic forms of free will, with the one supreme will of the Prius. The very virtue and efficacy of the Atonement is attributed to the cheerful oblation of the perfect will of Christ, the God-man, to His Father, God.

"I came not to do mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. Wherefore, when He cometh into the world He saith . . . Lo, I am come to do Thy will, O God. . . . By which will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." (Heb. x. 5, 7, 10.)

This willing oblation of His will was the keynote and motto of His whole life. "I must work the works of Him that sent Me while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." And death, when it came, was only the anticipated climax of His willing self-sacrifice.

But the reconciliation of the Atonement through the oblation of a perfect will is not limited to the Person of Christ. It is to find its counterpart on a lower scale in the life and experience of all His followers. The Christian must be like his Master. Christ is represented, not only as the New Man, but the Type of the New Creation. The daily prayer of the Christian is to be—"Thy will be done on earth, as it is in Heaven." And his whole life is to be one constant endeavour to give it practical expression, until the entire man, even to the innermost recesses of thought and motive, are brought into cheerful and loving acquiescence to what is held to be the Divine will.

And here I should like to point out the congruity between the end to be attained and the means employed for attaining it. The end is the triumph of good over evil through the reconciliation of divergent and opposing wills. The means are—

1. The exhibition of a faultless character appealing by its intrinsic loveliness to the moral perception of an intelligent and spiritual personality.

2. The action and influence of a Divine Spirit upon the cognate created spirit of man.[1]

[1] Heb. ii. 11: "For both He that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of One."

Such are the means to be employed, and according as they have been employed has Christianity proved itself a power for good in the world. Has Christianity, where it has been fairly tried, tended to raise the character of its followers, to liberate them from the thraldom of sin in all its countless forms, to make their lives pure, unselfish, and true? Then the secret of the transformation is to be found in the power of that Religion to bring about the reconciliation, not merely theoretic, but practical, of all individual and antagonistic wills to the supreme Will of the Personal Prius. And the prayer of the Psalmist—"Teach me to do Thy Will, O God, for Thy Spirit is good"—is something more than a pious ejaculation, a devout aspiration. It is the practical recognition and expression of a profound metaphysical truth.

SECTION IV.

PERSONALITY IN OTHER SYSTEMS—SPENCER, WUNDT, TOLSTOY.

(*a*) Schopenhauer's Thelology, impersonal and untenable—(*b*) Comte's "Religion of Humanity"—(*c*) Spencer's "Persistent Force"—Logical inference ignored—Correspondence between internal and external relations—Deduction from the foregoing—Professor Wundt on Personality—Personality the expression and measure of psychical endowment—Comparative Psychology—Stages of growth—Count Leo Tolstoy.

HEGEL'S Prius of "pure thought" is by no means the only one which has been propounded by philosophers.

"Will," said Schopenhauer, "is Lord of all," and "persistent Force unknown and inconceivable," says Mr. Spencer, is the Prius which ruthlessly closes the door to any further investigation. But neither to "Will" nor "Force" apparently is personality attributed. As I have already referred to Schopenhauer's "Will" theory in my former volume, I shall not devote much space to its

further consideration. The question to be considered is, at the bottom, this :—

Is "Will," apart from the person of a Willer, a philosophic concept? Does it not land us either in chance or necessity?

We are not justified in regarding Schopenhauer as the original propounder of the "Will" theory. On the contrary, he appears to have imbibed his views from the previous teaching of Fichte and Schelling. "The will is the living principle of reason," said Fichte. "In the last resort," said Schelling, "there is no other being but Will." Will is primal being. Where Schopenhauer differed from his teachers was in his physical or naturalistic views of Will, which, according to him, is the result of impulse given to the nerve-organs by the objects of the external world. Knowledge itself, and its instrument—the mind, or intellect—is immediately dependent on, and, as it were, the product of, these nerve-organs thus brought into action. This knowledge is only a type or special example of that intimate feeling, or will, which is the underlying reality and the principle of all existence,[1] the essence of all manifestations

[1] "Analogy and experience make us assume this will to be omnipresent."—Art. "Schopenhauer" in *Encyc. Brit.*

inorganic and organic. Thus, in Schopenhauer's system Will, impersonal and without motive, takes the place of reason or thought, as the Prius or primal principle of all things. And the origin of man is not to be sought for us by Hegel in any theory of self-manifestation of thought at unity with itself; nor, as by Spencer, in the theory of evolution, but in "automatic action" and "adjustment" which is everlasting and ever-present.

Both the "Will" of Schopenhauer and the "Force" of Spencer are alike the result of "automatic action." In both systems the Prius is impersonal, and they fail equally in affording a reasonable solution of that great problem of human personality. It is here, again, where Christian Metaphysic comes to the rescue with its personal Prius—a Prius which, while it embraces the Thought of Hegel, the Sovereign Will of Schopenhauer, and the "persistent Force" of Spencer, offers, at the same time, a reasonable theory on which to explain the fact of human personality.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer landed him at length in a sort of pessimistic Buddhism. The soul of man, unowned and uncared for, is born into a world of sin and sorrow, the sport for

a time of an insensate purposeless Will, until through death it reaches the Nirvana of the eternal oblivion. No wonder that Schopenhauer was the apologist of suicide.

Personality in Comte's System of the Religion of Humanity.

The Philosophical System of Comte so far resembles that of Hegel and Schopenhauer, that the only form of Personality which can be recognized is that of mankind. But it differs in this respect, that it merges individual in collective Personality. Comte even goes so far as to assert that the former is only an abstract idea, which has no existence save as part of the latter.

Not only can the individual not be separated from the social organism of which he forms a part; but that organism is something essential to his very existence. Thus the individual person has no separate existence. He exists only through the spirit which pervades the whole family of men, and manifests itself in them as a principle of life and development.

This is collective, as distinguished from individual Personality. And as being in Comte's view the highest and only form of Personality of which

we have any knowledge or experience, it not unnaturally led him on to the religion and worship of Humanity. The weakness and defect in Comte's system lies in mistaking a finite and particular example of being for the infinite and universal. His system of Humanity is nothing more than a philosophical fragment, detached from its proper surroundings, without antecedent and without consequent. He loses sight of the solidarity of all life, and the unity of all being. Beyond the collective Personality of man he propounds no Prius; while for that Personality he supplies no object, save the Personality itself which becomes deified as the highest and only proper object of human worship.

If mankind could be shut up in a box, or transported to a desert island, and cut off from all intercourse with the outer world until they imagined they were the only beings in existence, then Comtism as a philosophy, and the worship of Humanity as a religion, might suffice. But it cannot be. Humanity is only a part, and a very small part, in the equipment of the Universe. Doubtless man is the highest example of terrestrial life, the most delicately constructed, the most richly endowed. But to regard him as the hub

of the Universe, to construct a philosophy limited to his own microcosm, and to imagine there are no forms of sentient life but those he is aware of in this small satellite of perhaps the smallest of the solar systems, scattered in endless profusion through the boundless regions of space; to preach a religion in which man is to be worshipped as the only God; and to teach a morality in which the welfare of humanity is the highest motive and end; all this betokens, to my mind, such short-sighted self-conceit and such a want of the sense of integrity and proportion as it would be impossible to surpass.[1]

The recognition, however, of the collective Personality of mankind does import a sense of the responsibility of every man to the social body of which he is a member. This sense takes the form and is expressed by the term of Altruism, *i.e.* the absorption, or extinction, of

[1] "But the philosophy, which has gone so far, must logically go further. It is impossible to treat humanity as an organism without extending the organic idea to the conditions under which the social life of humanity is developed—*i.e.* to the whole world. And if the recognition of a universal principle manifested in humanity naturally led Comte to the idea of the worship of humanity, the recognition of a universal principle manifested in man and nature alike must lead to the worship of God." (*Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Metaphysic," p. 101.)

mere self-love in the nobler duty of promoting the welfare of the community at large.[1]

When, moreover, we come to consider the effect of such a sense of responsibility as a deterrent from self-destruction, we are bound to admit that theoretically it should have this effect.

"I am not free to injure or destroy myself; for such injury or destruction is done, not to myself alone, but to that body whose welfare ought to be to me a matter of paramount importance." But how far such theoretical reasoning will be practically effective as a deterrent from suicide is a matter of opinion. At any rate, it is the only and the strongest argument against suicide on the score of responsibility which could have any weight with a disciple of Comte.

Some provision for the religious instinct of man is afforded by proposing Humanity itself as an object of worship. Whether such worship is deserving the name of religion at all, any more than the Ancestor-worship of the Chinese, is open to question. The last day of the year is set apart in the Positivist Calendar for the commemoration of the dead, and in his address

[1] The same result is arrived at in the Christian system. But the premises are of a different and higher order, as will appear when we approach the subject of Christian Metaphysic.

delivered to the members of the Positivist Society, of which he is the head, on December 31, 1900, Mr. F. Harrison is reported to have said—

"The religion of submission to the will of humanity had no crude worship of heroes, no vain apotheosis of genius. The day was dedicated to all the dead—to nameless, as to those of name, to the lowly as to the great, to those who served as much as to those who ruled. . . . He need hardly remind them that the one name which he held to be destined to perpetual honour in the coming ages was that of the founder of the religion of humanity."

How utterly destructive such a system is of belief in any Personality higher than that of man is shown by the following instance:—

Some few years ago a young man, who had embraced Comtism and the Religion of Humanity, emigrated to America and settled in San Francisco. In a letter to his sister at home the following passage occurs:—

"You say you remember me in your prayers. This, so far as it is a mark of your sisterly affection, I fully appreciate. But, otherwise, you might save yourself the trouble. Believe me, there is no God. It is not that we have a God without ears, but there is absolutely no God to hear. In this country religion is a commodity for which

there is no demand. We find we can get on very well without it."

A missionary, who had been working in the same part of North America, once told me that in the course of a conversation he had with an old settler on the subject of religious education in the State Schools, the settler replied, "Oh, we have abolished God on this side of the Rockies; so we don't trouble ourselves much about religion or religious education."

Mr. Spencer's Prius and Personality.

Let us now turn to consider briefly Mr. Spencer's Prius in respect to Personality: for, like all other philosophers and metaphysicians, he is bound to have a Prius of some kind. Mr. Spencer's Prius is "Persistent Force." What does he mean by this expression? Let him speak for himself.

"By the persistence of Force we really mean the persistence of some Power which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations, as recurring, either in ourselves or outside of us, do not persist; but that which persists is the unknown cause of these manifestations."[1]

[1] *First Principles*, p. 187. And again, p. 192, he says, "In asserting it (persistent Force) we assert an Unconditioned Reality without beginning or end."

Thus the prime factor of Mr. Spencer's whole system is a Power which transcends our knowledge and conception. But, indeed, Mr. Spencer's statements and postulates respecting his persistent Force are inconsistent and mutually self-destructive. For first he calls it "a Power which transcends our knowledge and conception." And then, having done this, he proceeds to tell us that "every antecedent mode of the Unknowable must have an invariable connection, quantitative and qualitative, with that mode of the Unknowable, which we call its consequent." Mark the words "invariable connection, quantitative, and qualitative." How comes Mr. Spencer to know this, if his Persistent Force be both "unknowable" and "inconceivable"? And if, on the other hand, it be true that this connection between the Absolute Force and the phenomenal forces which we know, does exist, then how can he say that the Absolute Force, the "Unconditioned Reality" which persists, is unknown and inconceivable? We know what "the consequent modes" are, both physical and psychical, for they are matters of experience. And since there is "an invariable connection both *quantitative* and *qualitative* between these and all antecedent modes of the Unknowable Force, it is

obviously untrue to say the Force is unknown and inconceivable. Such "an invariable connection" amounts to an analogy, and must lead logically to something far more than the postulation of a Power transcending conception. It will surely enable us, if there be any truth in the analogy, to form, not indeed a perfect and exhaustive idea, but at least a general conception of the nature and characteristics of the Persistent Force, from which all other forces, both physical and psychical, proceed.

But the fault we have to find with Mr. Spencer is that, having assumed or postulated the existence of a great unknown and inconceivable Power, he forthwith proceeds to fabricate a philosophy and psychology in which it is practically ignored, in which, as a factor of thought or mind, it is entirely absent. Mr. Spencer's Force is clearly only a name for something unknown and unknowable, and which, therefore, he thinks may be practically shelved. It is shorn of what, even to man, is the highest concept and attribute of being, namely, self-conscious personality; and, save as a blind, unconscious force, it is permitted neither to intervene nor act in the Universe. All this is strikingly exemplified in the "Psychology," which from first

to last is the product of materialistic evolution[1] pure and simple. But is this philosophy? Ought not Mr. Spencer to have seen that, though his Prius transcends both our knowledge and conception, this by no means justifies him in excluding it as a working factor in any hypothetical scheme of nature? His Persistent Force may be unknown and inconceivable in its fulness, but, inasmuch as it is *ex hypothesi* the only source of all power, it must follow, that every form of force of which we have any knowledge and experience is a manifestation of that Force which persists in all things; and therefore all these various manifestations are so many indications of the nature of his Persistent

[1] After reviewing Mr. Spencer's doctrine of Persistent Force and his attempt "to bring organisms and societies and all thereto pertaining—life, mind, character, language, literature, and institutions of every kind—under the cover of a single formula," Professor Ward writes as follows: "We are, therefore, not surprised to find Mr. Spencer treating of the transformation of physical forces into mental forces, and insisting on a quantitative equivalence between the two, just as he treats of transformation of mechanical work into heat and the value in foot-pounds of a calorie. The poetry of Milton and the British Constitution, nay, the human mind and the Christian Religion, are all, according to him, equally with the tidal bore on the Severn, or gales at the equinoxes, so many secondary results of the nebular hypothesis, cases of integration of matter and dissipation of motion in obedience to the persistence of Force. It is to encompass all these within one formula that he is tempted to stretch a great physical generalization beyond all meaning and to justify his venture by questionable metaphysics concerning Absolute Being."—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i. p. 221.

Force—the unknown Power, "the Unconditional Reality" which, though it transcends our knowledge and conception, has not "left itself without witness." And if among the forces we know, whether simple or complex, there be one which is self-conscious and intelligent—that is, the human Personality—may we not safely postulate on behalf of Mr. Spencer's Persistent Force, that this, too, must be a self-conscious intelligent Personality? [1]

But Mr. Spencer's Psychology is vitiated throughout by the hiatus—the unbridged and unbridgeable abyss—between his Persistent Force and those material quantitative and mechanical forces which alone he allows to have been operative in the production of physical and psychical phenomena. Where does the Persistent Force intervene? Where in the whole of his evolutionary system, embracing products and organisms from the protozoa to the personal soul of man, do we find a nexus between the Force and the forces? Nowhere. But what do we find? A marvellous capacity for transmuting the *material* into the *ideal*. By the sweep of his magic wand, Mr. Spencer summons idealism

[1] My personality is one of those "consequent modes," which are "invariably connected with antecedent modes of the unknowable Force."

from the vasty deep of his imagination to crown his materialistic edifice. Sensations have only to recur a certain number of times, and forthwith they blossom into ideas and memories of the past There has but to be a complexity of impressions on the organism from without, which do not produce direct automatic action ; then after a period of hesitation, and a struggle for the mastery, reason, deliberation, and will spring forth like a *Deus ex machinâ* to settle the dispute and take the command.[1]

Correspondence between Internal and External Relations.

On no point does Mr. Spencer lay greater stress than that of the invariable correspondence between our internal and external relations. It is this, indeed, which lies at the root of his *experience*

[1] The following is a fair specimen of what we may call Mr. Spencer's dialectic. "We shall find that as, when more complex and less frequent correspondences come to be effected, the internal actions effecting them become less automatic: as in ceasing to be automatic they necessitate a previous representation of the motions about to be performed and the impressions about to be experienced, and in this involve at once both harmony and reason; so in this same previous representation they simultaneously involve the germ of what we call the feelings."—*Psychology*, p. 585. And again, p. 590, "As the psychical changes become too complicated to be perfectly automatic, they become incipiently sensational. Memory, reason, and feeling take their rise at the same time."

hypothesis. And the following is a brief summary of his position :—

1. Corresponding to absolute external relations, *i.e.* in the universe around us, there are developed in the nervous system absolute internal relations, developed before birth, antecedent to, and independent of individual experiences, and that are automatically established along with the very first cognitions.

2. These internal relations, nevertheless, are not independent of experiences in general, but have been established by the accumulated experiences of preceding organisms, handed down by heredity from parent to offspring.

3. Hence the brain represents an infinitude of experiences received during the whole evolution of life in general. The most uniform and characteristic of these experiences have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest, from father to son, and have thus slowly amounted to that high intelligence which is latent in the brain of the infant, which the infant, in the course of its after life, exercises and usually strengthens or further complicates, and which, with minute additions, it again bequeaths to future generations.[1]

[1] *Psychology*, p. 583.

I should be sorry to deny there is much truth in all this. It must, I think, be admitted that life means the power of adaptation and correspondence to environment; that outer and objective relations produce inner and subjective relations which answer to them, and that this correspondence has gone on increasing from the lowest to the very highest form of life, physical, intellectual, and psychical. This may be all quite true, and probably is. But we must not forget at the same time what the very theory necessitates, that without the real objective relations there could be no inner subjective relations. And, if it be true that our external relations are the cause of our internal, then, conversely, it is equally true that our internal are the record and reflex of our external. But what are our internal relations? Are they not summarized in our personality? Our personality is the involute and ultimate collective expression of all previous experiences. The brain is the muniment room wherein are treasured up the archives of our past history, and the title-deeds of the ever-increasing heritage of mankind.

What, then, is the conclusion to which we are led? This, namely, that somewhere in our external relations there is that which corresponds to our

own personality. Or, to put it briefly, the Personality of man implies and demands the Personality of God.

My whole psychical content, my perception of duty, my power to distinguish between right and wrong, between sin and holiness, my religious instinct, my sense of beauty, truth, and love, all these form part of my inner relations, and they are mine simply and solely because the Personal Prius, Who is in the world, has thus manifested Himself to me through the experience of my outer relations, through Creation and Immanence and Incarnation.

But does Mr. Spencer see this? Or, if he does, has he ever pointed out its far-reaching consequence in establishing the bond of affinity between the human Personality and the Divine? I am not aware that he has. On the contrary, having postulated an unknown persistent Force, the source of all other known forces, and of which every antecedent mode is *invariably connected* with its known consequent, he proceeds to construct the cosmos out of purely material elements, and to interpret the phenomena of Life, Mind, and Society in terms of matter, motion, and mechanical force, without so much as an allusion to

that postulated Force which is the only cause of all.[1]

To sum up, then, in few words, this is the conclusion to which the foregoing considerations bring me.

The human Personality is the latest and highest product of all past vital experiences, the fabric built up of internal subjective relations answering to those external relations which form its environment. It is like the lense of the camera, which gathers up and focuses into one consistent intelligible picture the multitudinous rays which fall upon it from the world without. And because it is all this, it bears irrefragable testimony to the unity in diversity of the Power which works in Nature, call it "persistent Force," or what you will; to the solidarity of all life, and the supremacy of a self-conscious, designing and, therefore, Personal Intelligence.

Professor Wundt and Personality.

According to Professor Wundt, Individual Personality is the unity of feeling, thought, and will, in which the will appears as the active power that sustains the other elements. "As the Ego is the

[1] See Ward's *Nat. and Ag.*, vol. i. p. 256.

will in its distinction from the rest of the conscious content, so Personality is the Ego reunited to this content, and thereby raised to the stage of self-consciousness." [1]

Now, without entering into the minute discussion of this definition, we may say, perhaps, that it is tolerably correct. What, then, is the presentment it gives us of Personality? It is that Personality is the final outcome of our psychical development —of feeling, thought, and will. And perhaps we shall not be far wrong in regarding Personality as the result of those same processes, evolutionary or otherwise, by which the rest of our psychical faculties and activities have come into being.[2]

But the effects of this admission, that Personality is the expression of the psychical content, is more far-reaching than at first sight appears.

In the first place, it is evident that man has no monopoly of what we may call psychical content, that is, of those faculties and functions which are usually supposed to fall within the domain of

[1] *The Principles of Morality*, by Wilhelm Wundt, professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. English Translation, p. 21.

[2] In saying this, I wish once more to guard against the supposition that evolution of itself is a power capable of creating anything. As my readers are aware, I hold that Evolution is only a *modus operandi*, which demands the power and presence of the Operator.

psychology. Intelligence, thought, feeling, will, memory, affection, these he shares, in common, with creatures far below him in the scale of animal life.

Man is but the last link in the great chain of evolutionary process, the heir of the accumulated experiences of a thousand generations of genera and species which have preceded him on the earth. And all along the line the Eternal Prius has been manifesting Himself in ever-increasing forms of beauty and loveliness. But there seems good reason for thinking that physiology and psychology have ever gone hand-in-hand, and form integral parts and different aspects of the progressive movement towards perfection.

If there be any truth in Darwin's *Origin of Species* regarded from a physiological point of view, then it must also be true, regarded from a psychical point of view. As the species advances in respect to its physical organism and differentiation, it will advance also in point of psychical faculty and development.

If, then, Personality be the expression of the psychical content, it follows (1) that man is not the only being that can claim it; and (2) that it will vary in each order of animal life in exact accordance with its psychical endowment.

Just because man is more richly endowed with psychical faculty than any other terrestrial order of beings, his Personality is the highest. But the lower orders of animated nature also possess a Personality varying according to their psychical content. I have a dog which goes with me to Matins every morning, but he patiently waits for me outside the church, because his psychical development does not enable him to join me in the service of prayer and praise to the common Maker and Father of us both.

In the lowest organisms, whose functions are limited to the common object of preserving life, either by procuring food, or avoiding danger, the Personality is only of the collective or social kind, and individual Personality does not as yet exist. But as we mount the scale of animal life, when the organism becomes more complex, and a variety of conturbing motives come into play, the psychical content is increased, and the personality tends to assume an individual character. Examples of both forms of Personality may be found in creatures far below the rank of man. Compare a flock of starlings, or a shoal of herrings, with the solitary spider spinning its web with almost mathematical accuracy, or the beetle burying its loathsome prey in the depths of the forest.

In the first two we see plenty of collective or social, but very little of individual personality. In the latter two, the exact converse is the case. The spider and the beetle, without being actually severed from the collective personality of their kind, appear to have acquired a sort of individual personality, which enables them to live and act for themselves.

Much of what Professor Wundt says on the relation of the social to the individual will is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the relation of the social, or collective, to the individual personality. But we shall do well to remember, that in neither case is their earliest origin and manifestation to be found in mankind. We must dig far deeper, if we would get to the root of the matter. The fact is we need a comparative psychology just as much as we need a comparative anatomy or physiology ; and no investigation of either subject can be thorough, which loses sight of the comparative aspect—that is, of the unity and solidarity of all forms of life.

The study of Natural History and Comparative Anatomy reveals the fact that, physiologically and structurally, man is allied to the lower orders of the Vertebrate Kingdom ; that he differs from them,

not so much in kind and form, as in degree and organic development. But we seem to have yet to learn that what is true physiologically is also true psychically, and that very much of the content of the human Personality is common also to the lower and less highly developed orders of animal life. As each successive genus or species increases in complexity of organization, so do the psychical functions and activities increase, and there is a corresponding advance to more specialized and individualized forms of personality.

That the earliest and lowest form of personality should be the collective or social is only what we should expect. It is a fact which connotes little more than what we understand by gregariousness. But as we rise higher in the scale of animal life the psychical content increases, and the birth of self-consciousness synchronizes with the appearance of individual personality and egoism. Each member of the community begins to see, not only that he is one of many, and with many, but that he is also a personal unit distinct from the rest, and capable of separate and independent action.

Then follows a higher stage, in which the individual perceives that this distinction and independence does not cut him adrift from the

family of which he is a member, but that his individual personality is something to be used for the welfare and advancement of the whole collective body. And last of all comes that stage of personal development in which the individual awakes to the conscious perception of his relation, not merely to the society with which he is most closely associated by birth and community of interests; not merely to the outward and material world of nature of which he forms a part, but to that Being Who, as Self-conscious Thought, is the Author of Nature, the Well of Life, and of Whose Being the whole Universe is only the glorious Self-manifestation.

Count Leo Tolstoy on Divine Personality.

The writings of Count Leo Tolstoy are now being much read in this country. In his booklet, *Thoughts on God*, he touches on the subject of Divine Personality. It will not therefore be irrelevant, and may be interesting, to ascertain what his views are.

The following is Tolstoy's definition of God :—

"God is that All, that infinite All, of which I am conscious of being a part, and, therefore, all in me is encompassed by God, and I feel Him in everything" (pp. 7, 8).

Again, he says, "God is love," and "Love is God" (pp. 9, 11).

"Somehow, while praying to God, it became clear to me that God is, indeed, in real Being, Love—is that All which I just touch, and which I experience in the form of Love" (p. 8).

But does not this last dictum, "Love is God," savour too much of other abstract conceptions of God; as, for example, the "Pure Thought" of Hegel, the "Supreme Will" of Schopenhauer, the "Deified Humanity" of Comte, the "Persistent Force" of Spencer?

There is truth in them all. But they are all partial and imperfect, and they all take their hue and complexion from the idiosyncrasy of the individual conceiver. And is it possible to entertain these concepts, save as attributes or qualities of Personality? Can we entertain the idea of thought without a Thinker of some kind? Of will without a Willer, and so on? Are we to conclude, that only in man do thought, and will, and force, and love assume a self-conscious personal form? If so, then, there is really no God but man.

I believe Count Tolstoy calls himself a Christian, and, therefore, it is the more surprising that he

should deny the Personality of God. Yet this he distinctly and emphatically does, as is evident from the following passages :—

"It is said that God should be conceived as a personality. This is a great misunderstanding; personality is limitation. Man feels himself a personality only because he is in contact with other personalities. If he were alone, he would not be a person.[1] . . . But how can we say of God that He is a person? Herein lies the root of anthropomorphism." [2]

And yet, while denying the personality of God, we find Tolstoy over and over again speaking of God in terms which necessarily imply His personality, and which are, to my mind at least, unintelligible, except on the supposition of it. Thus, "He is One." He is "the living God," in contrast to the pantheistic God.

"He is One, in the sense that He exists as a Being who can be addressed; that is, that there is a relation between me, a limited personality, and God, unfathomable, but existing." [3]

[1] This seems to me a gratuitous assumption, which is neither proved nor capable of proof. Take the imaginary case of Robinson Crusoe. Because he was cast on a desert island, and cut off from all intercourse with his fellow-man, did he cease to be a person, or to think himself one?

[2] *Thoughts on God*, p. 34. [3] *Ibid.*

Is not Tolstoy here struggling to reconcile ideas or concepts of the Divine Being which are essentially opposed? And this opposition is still further emphasized in his statement on Prayer.

"Prayer is addressed to a personal God, not because He is a person (I even know with certainty that He is not a person, because personality is limitation, and God is unlimited), but because I am a personal being."[1]

Tolstoy has just admitted that God is a Being, Who may be addressed in prayer—and therefore a Person, seeing we cannot address an abstract quality or even a bundle of such,—but now we are told, that we only address God as a person, because we are personal beings. In other words, that God has no objective personal existence, and cannot be addressed as a person except by a formal act of self-deception. And what becomes of prayer after this? What is it more than a psychical illusion; a poor piece of spiritual idolatry!

But Tolstoy is better than his creed. His religious instinct raises an indignant protest against his philosophy. The yearning after a personal God, realized in his own inmost soul, is

[1] *Thoughts on God*, p. 33.

too much for him ; and we find him breaking out in impassioned utterance to the very Being whose personality he had just denied.

"But, Lord, I named Thee, and my sufferings ceased. My despair has passed. I feel Thy nearness, feel Thy help when I walk in Thy ways, and Thy pardon, when I stray from them. Lord, pardon the errors of my youth, and help me to bear Thy yoke as joyfully as I accept it."

So said the Psalmist three thousand years ago. "My soul is athirst for God. Yea, even for the Living God."

"Fecisti nos ad Te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te."—"O Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it reposes in Thee." (St. Aug.)

SECTION V.

MATERIALISTIC MONISM AND PERSONALITY.

Monism and Personality—"Matter moving"—Vital Force?—Protoplasm—Professor Dolbear's definition—The problem to be solved—Subject and Object—Two observations—Professor Wundt and human progress—Phenomena and Noumena—St. Paul—Professor Bain's Hypothesis incompatible with Monism.

THE contention of the Materialistic Monist, as is well known, is that "everything that is, is matter moving." Which means, of course, that there is no other or higher form of Being. Such a theory, of course, is fatal to the idea of a Personal Prius. It will be desirable, therefore, to examine this theory and the arguments adduced in its support.

And, in the first place, it is to be noted that our scientists have not yet arrived at any general consensus of opinion, much less any certain knowledge of what matter is. It consists of atoms in motion, we are told. But what are atoms? The latest hypothesis concerning them is that they are

vortex rings, "a particular form of motion of the ether in the ether."[1]

In the second place, ether is very necessary, even to the Materialistic Monist. But I am not aware that ether has yet been proved, or even claimed to be, matter, but only "the primal substance out of which matter is formed."[2] Yet ether is something, and, if it be not matter, then what becomes of the Monist's contention that everything that is, is matter moving? Has he not destroyed his own Prius, and disproved his first proposition?

Vital Force.

It used to be thought that the difference between vital force and other physical forces was qualitative and essential. But our scientists tell us now that no such distinction exists; and that all the phenomena of life are to be explained by means of physical and chemical forces. The term "vital

[1] Professor Dolbear, *Matter, Ether, and Motion*, p. 351: "In like manner one may understand that what constitutes an atom is not so much the substance it is composed of, as the motion involved in it. Such *an atom is a particular form of motion of the ether in the ether*, in the same sense as what is called light is a form of motion of the ether in the ether. The one is an undulation, the other a vortex. . . . Thus one after another of the properties of matter are found to be resolvable into ether motions, ether being the primal substance, and matter only one of its manifestations."

[2] Professor Dolbear, *Matter, Ether and Motion*, pp. 297 and 351.

force" is only to be regarded as a convenient form of expression for "the sum total of the physical and chemical activities of organisms."[1]

Our Biologists, not so long ago, used to be content with tracing all animal life back to the egg. *Omne vivum ab ovo.* Then the cell[2] was substituted for the egg; but now they tell us we must go further back still, and find in a complex chemical substance called protoplasm the one fount and origin of all animal and vegetable life. And what is protoplasm?

[1] Professor E. L. Mark, Harvard University.

See also Professor Dolbear, *Matter, etc.*, p. 279: "That vital force as an entity has no existence, and that all physiological phenomena whatever can be accounted for, without going beyond the bounds of physical and chemical science, has to-day become the general conclusion of all students of vital phenomena; and vital force as an entity has no advocates in the present generation of biologists."

[2] Professor Dolbear's hypothesis respecting cell formation and growth is at least interesting and ingenious. I quote his own words: "In the organic world of living things the phenomenon of growth is manifested by what are called cells, which are symmetrical groups of molecules, as crystals are, only much more complex. Growth consists in the formation of similar cells out of suitable molecular constituents in the neighbourhood. Each different part of a plant or animal has a different cell structure. . . . Such formation is called growth; but the similarity in form and function, when appearing among plants or animals, has been considered as due to heredity, a term which has a definite enough meaning, but which has not been supposed to be due to mechanical, but to some super-physical agency not amenable to purely physical laws and conditions."—*Matter, Ether, and Motion*, p. 250.

Protoplasm.

The question is an important one, and it will be well to hear what Professor Dolbear, as representing the most recent scientific view, has to say about it.

"Protoplasm is a particularly complex chemical substance, out of which all living things, animals and plants are formed. It is entirely structureless, homogeneous, and as indifferentiated as to parts as is a solution of starch, or the albumen of an egg. Minute portions of this elementary life-stuff possess all the distinctive fundamental properties that are to be seen in the largest and most complicated living structures. It has the power of *assimilation*—that is, of organizing dead food into matter like itself—and, consequently, what is called growth. It possesses *contractility*—that is, the ability to move in a visible, mechanical way; and it possesses *sensitivity*—that is, ability to respond to external conditions: and the power of reproduction."

"A small particle of this substance, like a minute bit of jelly, without any parts or organs, possesses its various attributes in equal degree in every part. Any particular portion can lay hold on assimilable material, or digest it, or be used as a means of locomotion; so that what are called tissues of animals and plants represent the fundamental properties of the protoplasm out of which they have been built—thrown into prominence by

a kind of division of labour. The protoplasm organizes itself into cells and tissues in the same sense as atoms organize themselves into molecules, and molecules into crystals of various sorts, having different properties, that depend upon the kind of atoms, their number and arrangement in the molecule."[1]

Such is protoplasm, according to Professor Dolbear. And the difficulty which occurred to me in reading it was, not so much that of believing his description of it to be true, as of believing that such qualities as he attributes to it, *assimilation, contractility, sensitivity, reproduction* can possibly be due merely to the chemical and mechanical forces of matter, however complex its composition. I confess that at present the draft upon my credulity is greater than I am prepared to honour; and I should prefer to hold in suspense a while my opinion, as to whether there is, or is not, such a

[1] *Matter, Ether and Motion*, pp. 280, 281. Professors Quincke and Bütochli have even been attempting the manufacture of an artificial protoplasm, which, they say, exhibits changes in shape, and streaming movements like those of an amœba. But it is entirely void of vital qualities.—*Ibid.*, 368.

Liebig, the great scientist, was once asked, if he believed that a leaf or a flower could be formed, or could grow by chemical forces. His answer was significant. "I would more readily believe that a book on chemistry or botany could grow out of dead matter by chemical processes." No discovery has since been made to alter that opinion.

thing as *vital force*, distinct from chemical and mechanical force.[1] It may be that the cardinal doctrine of the Materialistic Monist, "Everything that is, is matter moving," though we do not admit it to be true, may yet help us to explain many of the phenomena which have hitherto proved insoluble. And the result of the careful and elaborate investigations of Sir William Crookes in this field of inquiry point to the conclusion that we have touched the borderland where matter and force, and consequently motion, merge into one another, and become one.[2]

But, however this may be, I can hardly imagine that even the most thorough-going Monist will contend that the chemical and mechanical forces alone are able to produce thought, and all that is comprehended under the heading of mental activity. And yet these also are realities which do exist, and for whose existence allowance and room must be made in any scheme of Philosophy or

[1] If there be no such thing as *vital force* apart from the chemical and mechanical forces, what is it in the animal organism that is able to control and countervail those forces for its own special purposes; forces which, so soon as life departs, become active in destroying the organism?

[2] See the Lecture delivered by Sir W. Crookes before the Royal Society, February 6, 1902, on "The Stratification of Hydrogen."

Metaphysic which can hope to hold its own in the future, and commend itself to the reason of unbiassed thinkers.

It must be remembered, that we have not only protoplasm, amœbas, hydras, and such-like things to account for, but what we may call Nature's *chef-d'œuvre*, the Personality of man, with all it connotes. And whatever theory be adopted, whether Monist or Dualist, it must be adequate to explain the existence, not only of the lowest, but also of the highest, forms of life of which we have any experience.

Let me borrow an illustration from the art of painting, though any other might do as well. Let us take two specimens of the art—a lower and a higher one—a painted box and a beautifully executed portrait. A description of the art of painting which would suffice, if only the painting of the box were considered, would manifestly be quite inadequate as a description of the art which produced the portrait. The first would require nothing more than the presence of material and mechanical agencies. You want a surface, like that of a box, pigment and a brush, together with such mechanical force as can wield the brush and apply the paint; and the thing is

done. But can the portrait be explained as the result of nothing but the same material and mechanical agencies? Evidently not. You may supply the canvas, the paint, the brushes, and the mechanical force, but all these are insufficient to produce the finished portrait. For this you require in addition the skill, the feeling, and insight of the accomplished artist. It is the highest product of the art, the finished work of the artist, and not merely the rough outline, nor the elementary daubs of a house-painter's apprentice, that have to be accounted for. And is it not so with Nature? It is not the manufacture of atoms into molecules and protoplasm and cells we have to account for, but the most finished work of which we have any actual knowledge and experience, the self-conscious, reasoning soul of man. The former we might, perhaps, conceive to be the product of chemical and mechanical forces, but, that the latter should be so, passes the bounds of reason and probability.

The fact is, that in the problem of life in its highest form we have not only *phenòmena*, but *nŏumèna* to consider.[1] And I hope the two

[1] "The conception of the phenomenal, of course, has brought with it the conception of a further so-called noumenal reality beyond."—Professor Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 166.

following observations will not be thought irrelevant to the subject before us.

Life and Experience. Subject and Object.

My first observation is this. Whatever may be the origin and first beginnings of life, as we know and experience it in all its forms and gradations, it is the product of two factors, the one subjective and capable of receiving impressions, responding to stimuli, and generally adapting itself to its surroundings ; the other objective, able to make impressions, impart stimuli, and generally to modify and influence every vital organism brought into contact with it. There is no form of life, from the amœba to the man, which is not the product of these two factors, which is not evoked by its environment, and which does not, if it is to continue, correspond to it. And the interaction between the subjective and objective is for each individual form of life represented and expressed by its experience. This view of Life, I am glad to find, is supported by Professor Ward in his book on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. These are his words—

" To enounce that experience is a whole, or, more precisely, a continuity, that it consists in the

correlation of subject and object as its universal factors, is a statement that seems to tamper with no facts and to involve no hypotheses." [1]

And again—

"Experience as a process may be further defined as a process of self-conservation, and so far justifies us in describing it as life (βίος)." [2]

Let me borrow another illustration of our argument at this point from a pastime with which some of my readers doubtless have been familiar in their boyhood's days, that of making a snow-man. Need I describe it? A handful of snow is pressed into a ball, and then rolled along a snow-covered lawn. As the ball rolls it accumulates the snow beneath it, growing at each revolution bigger and bigger, until it reaches the size required. We see there are three things necessary for the production of our snow-man. First, the initial snow-ball; second, the snow-covered lawn; third, the power

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 130.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 136. The following passage, also, is much to the point (vol. ii. p. 255): "If, as Kant does, we regard experience as starting with such an indefinite manifold as its objective complement, we must hasten to add, that the start is only made when this matter of experience is shaped and informed by the subject conscious of it and interested in it. . . . My contention is that to the subject belongs the lead and initiative throughout, and that, as experience develops, this subject shows an ever-increasing activity and supremacy."

to roll the ball along. Without each and all of these no snow-man will be forthcoming.

And now for the analogy. The initial snow-ball stands for the subjective element of life, with all its potency—call it what you will; the snow-covered lawn represents the objective environment of the Universe; and the revolving power denotes the energy which brings subject and object together, with that interaction between the two which constitutes experience, and out of which by accumulation the vital and psychical involute of the subject is continuously augmented.[1]

Of course, the above illustration is only a rough-and-ready one; but it may help to give a clearer conception of an hypothesis, which seems to the writer best to harmonize the claims of science and physics on the one hand, and of religion and metaphysics on the other. It is to be noted, too, that this hypothesis of Life, as the product of the subjective and objective factors realized in experience, provides indefinitely for the future progress and perfection of mankind.

[1] "We have found that our primary experience invariably implies both subjective and objective factors, and seems to involve these not as separable and independent elements, but as organically co-operant members of one whole."—Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 253.

According to Professor Wundt, the line of human progress is sociological. Man's final moral end is the moral end of humanity, not of the family or state, but of the race. We are to seek satisfaction and supplement the finitude and limitations of actual life in the form of (by) higher objective intellectual values.

"And so we find that our ultimate ends can be nothing but the production of psychical creations . . . whose final object is not the individual himself, but the universal spirit of humanity"[1]

But Professor Wundt is silent as to the means whereby this progress of the human race is to be secured. And, whatever we may think of the worth and adequacy of the moral end proposed, we cannot refrain from asking where are the materials out of which these "psychical creations" and "higher objective intellectual values" to be constructed? Are they to be found elsewhere than in an ever-increasing experience by the self-conscious subject of those activities, whether physical or spiritual, contained in its objective environment? And what is that environment but the Self-manifestation of the Personal Prius, "the fulness of Him that filleth all in all"?

[1] *Ethics*, p. 85.

Only because the snow-ball is rolled along the snow-covered lawn does it become the snow-man. So, only because the objective environment, which forms the raw material out of which experience is accumulated, contains all the elements requisite for vital and psychical development—higher psychical values—is progress in this direction possible. Surely it is in this enlarged and ever-increasing experience, which has the limitless *plenum* of the Infinite to draw upon, where we see the promise and the power of an endless advance towards perfection. And as, on the one hand, we are in no position to place limits on the degree or method of Self-manifestation which the Prius may think fit to adopt, so neither, on the other, can we see any limit to the progress which is ultimately attainable for mankind. That progress is not of the nature of a quantity which cannot be exceeded, or a standard which cannot be excelled; rather is it like a series of geometrical progression which goes on increasing *ad infinitum*.

Such is the view of human life and human progress propounded by the great Christian Metaphysician St. Paul.[1] The *phenomena* declare the

[1] Cp. 2 Cor. iii. 18: "But we all with open face beholding as in a glass (mirror) the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same

noumena of the Almighty. All down the ages has the Eternal Prius been manifesting Himself, now in one way, now in another. And if at last this Self-manifestation has reached its climax in the cardinal phenomenon of the Incarnation, should this surprise us? And, because we cannot fathom the mystery, shall we say "Impossible"? However much men may object to the Incarnation because it transcends Nature, and their own power to comprehend it, they cannot deny, that the life of Jesus has done far more than that of any other man to raise the moral concepts of mankind. It has not, indeed, driven sin and wickedness out of the world, for the simple reason that men will not submit themselves to its restraining and constraining influence. But in exact proportion as they have done so, and tried honestly to embody that influence in their own lives, it has raised those lives to a standard of purity and goodness higher than the world has ever seen. That love is the secret of that influence, I need not stop to point out.

Not in Sociology, then, as it seems to me, are

image from glory to glory." And Ephes. iv. 13: "Till we all come unto a perfect man . . . unto the measure of the stature of the fulness (πληρώματος) of Christ."

we to find the highest and truest line of human progress, but in that experience which brings us into ever closer union and communion with the Being Who through phenomena and noumena is ever manifesting Himself in fuller measure as the only Source of love and truth and beauty.

Phenomena and Noumena.

My second observation is this. The problem before us is one which involves more than physical phenomena.[1] Were it not so, the Monist, who thinks to find in "matter moving" the universal solution, might not consider his task a hopeless one.

It is not so, however. Noumena, as well as phenomena, must be taken into account; where by noumena we mean those things which are the objects of our understanding, and are dealt with by reason and intellect. They are mental and spiritual concepts, which form the subject-matter of Metaphysic as distinguished from Physics, which professes to deal only with phenomena.

[1] "It follows naturally from the notion of a phenomenon of any sort that something must correspond to it that is not itself phenomenon"—that is, without a percipient nothing can be perceived.—Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, p. 233.

Perhaps there is no passage which will better serve to illustrate the distinction between the two than that of the great Doctor of Christian Metaphysic, St. Paul, in his letter to the Romans,[1] and which, I trust, I may be pardoned for quoting. The passage in the Revised Version runs thus :—

"For the invisible things (*aorata*) of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood (*nooumena*) by the things that are made (*poiēmasi*), even His Eternal Power and Godhead."

Here, it will be observed, we have allusion made to *phenomena* and *noumena*. The former are the *poiēmata*, the things made; the latter are the *aorata*, the invisible things, which are in reality the Eternal Power and Godhead, and become *noumena* to us by means of the phenomena of the created Universe.

Clearly, St. Paul was no Monist. In other words, he recognized the fact that the world of Metaphysic is as real as that of Physics; and that the noumena of the former, though distinct from the phenomena of the latter, refuse equally to

[1] Rom. i. 20. Some of my readers would like to be reminded of the original: Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης.

be ignored. Nor is this all. He enunciates the cardinal doctrine of Christian Metaphysic, that *phenomena* and *noumena*, though distinct in their essential nature, are still intimately, and as it were organically, connected; and that phenomena are the expression of noumena, and at the same time the vehicle and the sacraments through which they are apprehended by the mind of man. And here, as it seems to me, is the point where Monism utterly and hopelessly breaks down. It fails in the presence of noumena; it fails before the fact of the Personality of man.

Professor Bain's Hypothesis.

Professor Bain, in his book on "Mind and Body," after reviewing the arguments of Monism and Dualism respectively, arrives at the following conclusion :—

"The arguments for the two substances (Material and Immaterial) have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—*a double-faced Unity*—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case." [1]

[1] *Mind and Body*, p. 196.

I venture to submit the following observations :—

1. That Professor Bain's hypothesis is incompatible with Monism proper. I do not see how a Monist can postulate a Substance with two sets of properties as his Prius, for the simple reason that it is compounded of two elements, or categories, which, so far as I know, are by universal consent regarded as essentially different and distinct. I take it, therefore, that Professor Bain regards Monism pure and simple as untenable; because, while it might be able to explain and account for physical phenomena, it fails in the presence of mental and spiritual noumena.

2. Professor Bain is in favour of "one Substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental — *a double-faced Unity*," which he thinks "would comply with all the exigencies of the case," *i.e.* be able to explain and account both for all phenomena and noumena.

Let us examine this hypothesis: "*One Substance.*" What is *substance?* Evidently, from the etymology of the word, it denotes that which stands under (*sub-stat*), or underlies that which

is evident to the senses. Substance is therefore the substrate of phenomena. It represents the inner reality or essence of things. As such it is synonymous both in derivation and meaning with the Greek hypostasis (ὑπὸ ἱστήμι); and it is almost needless, I suppose, to remind my reader, that not only in Philosophy but in Christian Theology both *substance* and *hypostasis* have acquired a well-recognized meaning.[1] Thus, in the Nicene Creed, so called, the Christian expresses his belief in the Divinity of Jesus Christ, as "being of one Substance with the Father;" and again in the Athanasian Creed, or Exposition, "Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance;"—in both which passages it is evident that "Substance" is used to denote the Essence (Greek *Ousia*) of Deity, or, as it is otherwise termed, "the Godhead."

[1] *Substance* as a theological term denotes that which forms the Divine essence, or being. It is used in this sense in the first of the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion: "And in the Unity of this Godhead there be Three Persons of one substance (*essentia*), power, and eternity."

Hypostasis has not in all ages of the Church had precisely the same meaning. In the first three centuries it was commonly used as the equivalent of the Latin *Persona*, though not universally. By many, however, it was used in the same sense as *Substantia*, that in which the Divine attributes inhere. These differences were reconciled at the Council of Alexandria (A.D. 362), and chiefly through the influence and arguments of St. Athanasius.

Does Professor Bain, then, use the word "Substance" in a sense analogous to that in which it was used by the Christian Fathers? We might almost suppose he does, from his subsequent remark, "We are to deal with this (substance, this *double-faced unity*) as in the language of the Athanasian Creed, 'not confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance.'"

But if so, might I venture to remind him, that mind and "mental properties" are, so far as we know and experience them, the inseparable attributes of Personality?[1] A substance, therefore, endowed with mental properties cannot, it would seem, be other than personal; nor "*a double-faced unity*," which "complies with all the exigencies of the case," less than Divine.

[1] See Sir G. G. Stokes' *Gifford Lectures*, p. 196.

SECTION VI.

PERSONALITY AND THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF NATURALISM.

Psycho-physical Parallelism and Epi-phenomena—Consequences of the Mechanical Theory in regard to Personality, Morality, and Religion.

CLOSELY allied to Materialistic Monism comes the theory that all Nature is but one vast mechanism, and which regards mental and psychical activities as mere Epi-phenomena—manifestations, that is, which accompany the working of the machine, but between which and the physical phenomena no causal connection exists. Psycho-physical Parallelism is the name given to this strange concept—a mere name, which explains nothing, and is nothing, but the last refuge of Agnosticism.

The whole theory has been so exhaustively examined, and its fallacy so convincingly exposed by Professor Ward, that I shall simply refer my

reader to his Treatise,[1] and content myself with offering a few observations to show how Personality fares at the hands of Naturalism.

Even if Nature and the whole Universe were nothing more than one vast piece of machinery, in which all the parts work smoothly and harmoniously together for the production of an infinite number of results useful and beautiful, still it is contrary to all our experience of machines, that they make themselves. And to maintain, that by calling Nature a machine we offer any adequate account of its principles and processes, would be much the same as being taken into a room where spinning and weaving was going on, and told that machinery was the secret of it all. The wool or the flax goes in at one end as raw material, and comes out at the other the flowery damask or the pictured tapestry. "Yes, here is the machinery, sure enough," we should reply, "but where is the machinist, who designed and constructed the machine? Where is the power that started the machine and keeps it going? And where is the artist who drew the designs and pictures so beautifully and accurately reproduced in damask

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i. pt. i.

and tapestry? Did the machine make them too? If so, it is of a different order to any machine I ever met with."

It is almost needless to point out, that in Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory there is no place for any higher form of Personality than that of man, even if there be room for that. It is the naturalist's boast that he has no need of God; but he does not seem to see, that in his effort to eliminate God as mind and intelligence from Nature, he also expunges man as anything more than a conscious automaton bereft of will and spontaneity.[1]

"We must say," says Professor Ward, "and the Naturalists have had the courage to say it:

[1] Professor Huxley, who was the first to broach the doctrine of conscious automatism as the logical outcome of Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory, thus wrote: "Any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant *gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity*."—*Collected Essays*, i. 159.

And again, "If these positions are well based, it follows that the feeling we call volition is not the *cause of a voluntary* act, but the *symbol of that state of the brain* which is the immediate cause of that act."—*Ibid.*, i. 244.

In these two passages we have the result of the Mechanical Theory in its bearing on the Personality of man put before us in its naked simplicity. A creature devoid of spontaneity can in no true sense of the word be called a Person. And if, as Laplace boasted, there is no need for God in the Universe, there is also no room for man.

The physical world is a complete whole in itself, and goes along altogether by itself. We must say: The very same laws fundamentally, that determine the varying motion of the solar system, bring together from the four corners of the earth the molecules that from time to time join in the dance we know as the brain of a Dante, creating immortal verse, or as the brain of a Borgia, teeming with unheard-of crimes."[1]

In Psycho-physical Parallelism we recognize our old friend Physiological Psychology in a slightly altered guise; but to use the term as throwing any new light on the psychological problems is to darken counsel by words without knowledge. That subject and object, and the interaction between the two in the field of experience, is the cause of psychical activity, and development is at least an intelligible view to take of human nature. But to substitute phenomena and epi-phenomena for object and subject is neither logical nor intelligible. It is not logical, for phenomena are not phenomena except to a subject, *i.e.* to the person perceiving them. And it is not intelligible, for to explain mental and psychical activities, such as thought and spontaneity, as examples of psycho-physical parallelism—by-products, that is, which

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 59.

accompany molecular changes in the brain, but neither cause nor are caused by them—is a process which conveys no idea to the mind.[1]

Results of the Mechanical Theory.

It will be well we should take account of what the triumph of Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory would entail.

If, indeed, Nature, which here means the entire Universe, is only a machine, then the naturalists are right in saying there is no such thing as will (in spite of Schopenhauer) in Nature. Nature must go along of itself by necessity, or not at all. And so there can be no Mind to guide or control it. In short, there is no personal God.

Similarly, also, with man. If he is only a machine, he, too, has no free will. But free will—that is, the power to decide on our line of action after reason and deliberation—is inseparable from our notion of Personality. Thus the Mechanical Theory pushed to its logical issue is *fatal to all Personality, whether human or Divine.*

Nor is this all. If there be no such thing as

[1] "Invariable concomitancy means causal connection somewhere, and a fundamental unity of *substance* at bottom. Naturalism is driven to assign the causality to matter, and to treat mental epiphenomena as its collateral product."

spontaneity and free will, but all our so-called acts of choice are only the necessary consequence of circumstances, which we are powerless to alter or resist, then it goes without saying, that all the conditions needful for moral conduct are destroyed. Morality is only possible in the case of free agents.

Again, if there be no free will—by which I mean the power to choose and shape our conduct in accordance with reason—then reason itself becomes a cruel mockery. Nay, we must conclude that, though we think we are guided by reason, it is not really so. Our reason, like our will, is only an epi-phenomenon accompanying some molecular movement of the brain between which and our actual course of conduct there is no causal connection. It has generally been held that will is the executor of reason; but if there be no free will, then reason has no executor. It is a useless gift; for however much we use it, it is powerless to influence our conduct.

With religion gone, and morality gone, and man himself but a machine driven by necessity, it would be difficult to imagine a more gloomy outlook for humanity!

Of course, the consequences of a theory afford no valid argument against the truth of it. But,

if they are such as they appear to be in this case, they constitute a high probability that there is a serious flaw in the reasoning somewhere, which should make us exceedingly cautious how we accept the theory as true.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE MECHANICAL THEORY.

The moral and psychological tendency of the Mechanical Theory is clearly set forth by Mr. I. F. Nisbet in his book, *The Human Machine*. I call my reader's attention to the following extracts :—

Free-will.—"Free-will! a figment of the imagination only" (p. 41).

Conscience.—"Conscience, like morality, is a habit of mind, created by the circumstances of a people or a race, and varying, therefore, according to circumstances" (p. 237).

Altruism.—"It is the product of the steamboat, the railway, and, above all, the newspaper" (p. 224).

Thought.—"After all, sensation—nay, thought itself—is only a question of molecular action" (p. 169).

Religion.—"God does not make man, but man makes God 'after his own image and likeness.' The reason why Christianity is the dominant form of religious belief in England is to be found in atmospheric influence" (see p. 227).

SECTION VII.

BEAUTY IN RELATION TO PERSONALITY.

What is beauty?—Quantitative and qualitative analysis—Origin of the Æsthetic Faculty—The evidential value and witness of beauty—The functions of beauty—Ideals of beauty—The Christian Ideal—Beauty teleologic.

THAT there is in Nature a power which makes for beauty, and that there are in Nature many forms and kinds of beauty, I imagine, will not be disputed. But there is more in these statements than meets the eye; and as statements of fact they demand careful consideration.

Of course, the great question I have to keep before me, and the only one which can justify me in touching on this subject at all in connection with our present inquiry, is this: "Does beauty bear any witness to Personality? If so, what is it? What is its evidential value, and what are its functions?"

There are, indeed, two other inquiries prior even to these, namely, "What is beauty?" And secondly, "Whence comes the faculty to perceive, admire, and love the beautiful, without which all objective forms of beauty would be lost upon us?"

But these are questions of a somewhat recondite and metaphysical nature, into which neither the time nor space at my disposal will allow me to enter fully. On these points, therefore, I shall content myself with laying down a few propositions, the truth and proof of which I must leave to my reader's judgment and investigation.

What is Beauty?

A hundred years have elapsed since Burke published his Treatise on "The Sublime and Beautiful;" and, though many discoveries in science and art have been made since then, not much additional light has been thrown on the subject. What were difficulties to him remain for the most part difficulties to us. And we are struck with the truth of his observation that—

"The great chain of causes which links them one to another, even to the throne of God

Himself, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours."[1]

And again, as to the efficient cause of sublimity and beauty, "I would not be understood to say that I can come to the ultimate cause."[2] And, indeed, the forms and kinds of beauty are so varied and numerous, according as they are fitted to give pleasure to the bodily or mental faculties, that it seems improbable there should be any one essential element common to them all. But what does seem probable is, that all forms of beauty are divisible into two general classes, the first of which we may call quantitative and the second qualitative.

Analysis of Beauty—Quantitative and Qualitative.

In the first class will be comprised all those forms of beauty which appeal to, and are perceived by the senses. These are material, formal, and to a large extent numerical, because matter, form, and number[3] are more or less involved in them.

[1] Burke on *The Sublime and Beautiful*, p. 255.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[3] Thus, musical strings of equal thickness and tension will produce harmonious sounds when struck together, if their lengths be in harmonic progression, *i.e.* if their reciprocals are in arithmetical progression. Hence number would seem to lie at the root of beauty in sound. Similarly also with regard to beauty in colour.

In the second division will be comprised all those forms and kinds of beauty which appeal to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual faculties. And in contradistinction to those in the first class they are ideal and spiritual. But we are not to suppose from this analysis that the two classes of beauty—the quantitative and the qualitative—are always separate and distinct. On the contrary, they are frequently found united or intermingled. They seem to act and react on each other, and the material form has frequently the power to call forth a corresponding form of ideal beauty, of which the former is the symbol. Still, apart from these concessions, the two kinds of beauty appear to differ essentially in their character, just as the phenomenal differs from the noumenal, and the senses of the body from the

Difference in colour is well known to depend on the length of the ether waves producing that colour, which, again, is a matter of number. Thus, red light has the longest wave-length, about $\frac{1}{40000}$th of an inch, and violet the shortest, about $\frac{1}{60000}$th; so that both in sight and sound number may be the ultimate and determining element of beauty. And even those forms of beauty of which the other senses are cognisant—such as touch, taste, and smell—may eventually be found to depend on the number and arrangement of the molecules which excite the corresponding sensory nerves. On this point, however, our present knowledge of molecular physics does not enable us to speak with certainty. Harmony, proportion, and symmetry, it will be generally admitted, are important elements in beauty of form, and these, again, are essentially numerical.

faculties of the mind and soul. Thus, for example, we may take up a book, beautifully bound and illustrated, and containing the life and sayings of some good and great man. With the eye we admire the beauty of the binding and illustrations, and with the mind and moral perceptions the beauty of the character portrayed and the sentiments expressed. But no one, I suppose, would regard these two forms of beauty as identical, or imagine that the one could be expressed in terms of the other.

Whether the charm of qualitative forms of beauty is due to any one essential element or quality common to them all, it is at present impossible to say. We are conscious of the beauty of justice, truth, and love; but as they give us pleasure through the exercise of sentiments so different as admiration, reverence, or respect, and affection, it would seem that the beauty of each is, at least, equally distinct.

Origin and Development of the Æsthetic Faculty.

As to the origin and growth of what we may call the æsthetic faculty—that is, the power to perceive and appreciate beauty in its various forms—I do not see that it can be explained in

any other or more consistent manner than that in which I have ventured to suggest the other components of our psychical equipment should be accounted for, namely, through the experience of the vital organism when brought into contact with the Prius, immanent in Nature, and manifested through its environment. If this be so, the æsthetic faculty, and what we call the taste for the beautiful, will be the result of experience accumulated and transmitted by heredity in ever-increasing volume from parent to offspring, from generation to generation, all down the course of time. According to this view, the subjective sense, or instinct, of the beautiful, and beauty in the objective environment, constitute the two necessary factors in the problem. They are counterparts of one united and consistent whole; another example of "the power of adjustment and correspondence," which forms the irreducible minimum, as it is, perhaps, the nearest approach to a true definition of Life.

The Evidential Value and Witness of Beauty.

Having said thus much in answer to our two preliminary inquiries, "What is beauty?" and "What is the origin of the æsthetic faculty?"

let us pass on to consider our two main questions, (1) "What is the significance of beauty, its evidential value and its witness?" (2) "What are the functions of beauty, and what purpose does it serve?"

The countless forms of beauty, both quantitative and qualitative, by which we are surrounded produce within us the irresistible conviction, that there is in Nature and the Universe *a Power which makes for beauty as an end in itself, apart from utility.* What is this Power? To suppose that beauty is the result of chance or necessity is too absurd. The mechanical theory of Nature might conceivably produce what is mechanically useful; but to regard beauty, which has no utility in the working of the machine, as amongst those products involves a draft on our credulity to which few, I imagine, will be equal.

Darwin, in his *Origin of Species*, found the subject of beauty too important to be entirely ignored. But, as might be expected, its main interest for him lay in the influence, which beauty might be supposed to exert in the origin of species through natural or sexual selection. The belief to which he refers, that organic beings have been created beautiful for the delight of man, need not detain

us, for the simple reason that the earliest forms of animal and vegetable life, which existed on the earth long before the appearance of man, are often remarkable for their beauty—for example, the diatoms and volute and cone shells of the Eocene epoch.[1] And the microscope reveals the fact, that the most minute organisms, which cannot be detected by the unaided sight, are often wondrously beautiful.

"Flowers," said Darwin, "rank amongst the most beautiful productions of Nature." But he could see no higher object in their beauty than that they might attract insects, and so become fertilized. Hence he concludes "that, if insects had not been developed on the face of the earth, our plants would not have been decked with beautiful flowers." Let the reader call to mind the countless forms of beauty to be found amongst flowers—their matchless colouring, their graceful shapes, their exquisite perfumes—and then ask himself, "Is it conceivable that all this wealth of beauty should have been massed together merely for the purpose of attracting insects on which the greater portion of it would be entirely thrown away?" Surely only one

[1] *Origin of Species*, pp. 160, 161.

answer is possible to all persons whose judgment is not biassed in favour of a preconceived theory.

Mr. Darwin was willing to admit, indeed, "that a great number of male animals, and a host of magnificently coloured butterflies have been rendered beautiful for beauty's sake," yet this, he contended, had been "effected only through sexual selection; that is, by the more beautiful males having been continually preferred by the females." But Mr. Darwin seems to have overlooked the fact that, before this could happen, even on his theory, there must have previously existed, first, on the part of the females a taste for the beautiful, and secondly, on the part of the males different degrees of beauty, without which there would be no room for preference to show itself by the females. Mr. Darwin makes no attempt to explain these difficulties, though, strange to say, he afterwards makes the admission, that in order to account for the æsthetic faculty "there must be some fundamental cause in the constitution of the nervous system in each species." Exactly so! How strange, then, that he should have suggested such trivial and unsatisfying causes for beauty in the floral and animal world as he

has done! His argument about the flowers is a veritable case of *post hoc propter hoc.*

Of course, we had no right to expect Mr. Darwin to give us an exhaustive treatise on beauty, and what he has said only touches the merest fringe of the subject.

The fact remains, and cannot be contested, that there are countless forms and kinds of beauty, quantitative and qualitative, phenomenal and noumenal, besides those which Darwin refers to. And the question for us at present to consider is, "What is their united significance?"

I venture to submit that a thoughtful unprejudiced attempt to answer this question will bring us to some such conclusions as these:—

1. All forms and kinds of beauty proceed from one common source or origin.

2. As productions of the Power which makes for beauty in the Universe they must bear witness to the nature and attributes of that Power.

3. But beauty is intelligible. Therefore the Power that produces it must be itself intelligent. Many and various as are the forms of beauty, they all unite in bearing consonant and consistent witness to the Being from Whom they proceed.

4. And lastly, if beauty be not the result of

Chance, or Necessity, or impersonal Will, or physical Force of any kind, is there any other conclusion to come to more reasonable than this, namely, that beauty is a mode of manifestation whereby the Personal Prius reveals Himself through Creation, through Immanence, through Incarnation and Inspiration, as the only Source of beauty and the Creator of all things beautiful because He loves them?

The Functions of Beauty.

We now come to ask, in the next place, to what purpose is all this wealth of beauty, and what are its functions in this universe of phenomena and noumena in which we find ourselves placed? One thing is evident at the outset, that beauty possesses great attractive power. This is clearly so in what we call the quantitative and formal kinds of beauty. And the higher we mount in the scale of beauty—that is, the more our moral and spiritual faculties become conscious of qualitative forms of beauty, such as justice, truth, and love—the stronger does the attractive power become.

How far animals below the rank of man are susceptible to the influence of beauty—as, for example, in the selection of their habitats and

companions—it is not possible to say. But, at any rate in our own species, we know that beauty counts for much in both respects. External beauty in woman, whether of form or face, is perhaps the quickest, though not the worthiest, stimulant of the amatory passion.

From this generally attractive power of beauty I think it is possible to form some correct idea of what its functions are. And I would state them briefly as follows:—

(*a*) To give pleasure. To add charm to life, and make it worth the living. "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever."

(*b*) To civilize, educate, and perfect humanity.

Next to nature, there is perhaps nothing which gives greater pleasure, and at the same time exercises a more civilizing influence on mankind, than Art. But what is Art? Is it anything else than the effort to realize and embody the beauty of Nature in a permanent form? Painting, sculpture, and music, these are the commonest forms of artistic beauty, and how greatly do they contribute to the enjoyment and civilization of mankind—the beauty in many instances being not quantitative or formal only, but calling up by association ideas of moral or spiritual beauty!

But it is when we come to those forms of qualitative beauty, which partake of a social, moral, or spiritual character, that we see the educational influence of beauty most clearly displayed.

Ideals of Beauty.

In all ages, and in every country, men have formed their ideals of beauty, and through these have sought to carry men onward to perfection. Great ideals—that is, ideals beautiful in their social, moral, or spiritual character, are the powers that have ruled, and will continue to rule the world. It is the moral ideal which, according to Professor Wundt, is to attract men onwards and upwards, and result, to use his own favourite expression, in ever-increasing "*psychical values.*"

But of all ideals of beauty, there is none, perhaps, which has exercised, and, I truly believe, is destined to exercise, a more powerful influence for good than the Christian.

"Speaking of this Ideal," says Dr. Davidson in his *Christian Ethics*,[1] it is one "of the most fascinating kind. . . . It is seen in the life and

[1] *Christian Ethics*, by W. L. Davidson, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, p. 114.

character of Jesus, as portrayed to us in the Gospels, and interpreted by the New Testament writers—absolute purity, realized under human conditions by Him who was the Perfect Man; filial intercourse and communion with the Father; intense and unremitting never-failing obedience, and unqualified submission to the Divine Will; ungrudging devotion to the highest interests of mankind. And this Ideal, manifested to us by Him, Who is the Head of Humanity, works in those who accept it, by transforming them into the likeness of Christ their Master, and therefore into the likeness of God—for Christ is "the image of God and the revealer of His character."

And again, "Not only is the Ideal attainable, it is all on the lines of righteousness, and of man's highest spiritual progress . . . it is human nature in its highest form, appealing to imperfect human nature and drawing it to itself and, in drawing, purifying it." [1]

Among all the ideals of beauty which have ever captivated mankind, the world may safely be challenged to produce one which in point of purity and loveliness will compare with this. The beauties of Nature and Art add immeasurably to the pleasure of life, and, besides this, conduce to the civilization and refinement of mankind. But the beauty of the Christian Ideal does far more

[1] *Christian Ethics*, pp. 112, 116.

than this. It is the very finger of God, whereby He reforms the sin-stained soul of man into the image of His own perfection.

Surely, then, men will do well to cultivate beauty in one or other of its varied forms, and in as many of them as they can, for it is a thing Divine. Let them surround themselves with the works of beauty in Nature and Art. Let them make their homes beautiful, their gardens beautiful, their places of worship beautiful, and bring beauty, so far as possible, into every department of daily life—the beauty of form, of sound, of colour—in music and painting, in sculpture and architecture. For every one will add some new charm to life, and help to relieve that tedium and monotony which has brought many a man to a suicide's grave. But let us not forget that, while beauty is the robe of God, sin is as surely its cankerworm. And, above all, let us not neglect those far higher forms of beauty which are disclosed to us through the Christian Ideal. All earthly and material forms of beauty will pale on the sight and pall on the taste. But this is the beauty of the God-like character, "the highest thing conceivable by us, and the highest thing desirable. There is nothing greater that the mind can picture, nothing better

that the heart can wish."[1] To those who will yield themselves to its attractive influence, the Christian Ideal will be one of ever-unfolding splendour. They shall find that even life on earth may become the pathway to heaven. And as they journey on they will gain, ever and anon, sweet glimpses of the glories that await them at their journey's end, when they "shall see the King in His beauty, and behold the land of far distances."

NOTE.—It is almost needless to point out that, if the functions of beauty are such as I have ventured to describe them, then beauty itself is in the highest degree teleologic and purposive.

[1] *Christian Ethics*, p. 114.

SECTION VIII.

PERSONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

Hegel, Spencer, and Comte—Altruism—The Incarnation, and the Fatherhood of God as the source of human responsibility—The brotherhood of Man—Conclusion.

THE bearing of the foregoing discussion of Personality on Responsibility is, I think, sufficiently obvious. Of my own personality I entertain no doubt. But the question is this: Is my personality related to and conditioned by any other personality higher than my own? If it is not, if there be no other or higher Personality than my own, then in no true sense of the word can I be called a responsible Agent. Responsibility means liability to be called to account for myself and my actions to another Person, who has the right and the power to summon me before his tribunal, and reward or punish me accordingly. Thus, not only does responsibility depend on

Personality, but our view of responsibility will derive its scope and character from that conception of Personality which our Religion and Metaphysic are calculated to produce.

The metaphysical system of Hegel, with its Prius of "pure thought," reaching Personality only in the self-conscious spirit of man, does not present the elements and conditions necessary for responsibility, for the simple reason that a self-conscious agent cannot be responsible to an impersonal "pure thought" or "philosophy." [1]

Neither is there room for responsibility in Mr. Spencer's system, which only postulates an unknown and unknowable Prius of Persistent Force. Such a Prius can never be the object of moral and religious regard. Between it and the self-conscious Personality of man no moral relations, such as are implied in a sense of responsibility, can possibly exist.

The same may be said of Comtism and the ethical system which is legitimately bred from it. It was Comte's avowed aim to set up the Religion

[1] Hegel's attempt to make his "Logic" square with Christian Metaphysic and Religion was a failure, posterity being judge. Much as he would have deprecated such a result, the only goal to which his system legitimately led was a philosophical pantheism.

of Humanity for that of Christ, to put man on the throne of God, and substitute the Social for the Theologic Idea.[1] Here, again, then, there is no room for a Responsibility higher than that which each individual owes to that deified Humanity which is proposed as the only object of worship.

Not that even such a responsibility as this is to be despised—the responsibility of each member of society to produce "higher psychical values," as Professor Wundt expresses it, and so to work for the progress and perfection of Humanity. But it is of such a vague and shadowy nature that its influence on the bulk of mankind, whether as a deterrent or incentive, could never be great. And at any rate this is not the kind of responsibility we are now discussing. Doubtless it is a noble thing in theory to be striving for the realization of the "Social Ideal." But where there is no moral Arbiter, higher than the tentative and

[1] His third course of Lectures on the Positive Polity ended with these remarkable words:—

"The servants of Humanity claim as their due the general direction of this world. Their object is to constitute a real Providence in all departments—moral, intellectual, and material. Consequently they exclude, once for all, from political supremacy, all the different servants of God—Catholic, Protestant, or Deist—as being at once behindhand, and a cause of disturbance."

fluctuating judgment of Society, no tribunal to dispense justice, to punish the evil and reward the good, there is practically nothing to call forth the sense of responsibility in the true sense of the word.

And, again, even this kind of responsibility, like Altruism, finds its real source, as also its abiding home, in Christianity. The Christian, as well as the Comtist, is responsible for the production of "higher psychical values." He, too, is bound to live and work for the attainment of a "Social Ideal,"[1] only in this case the Ideal is of a higher and more transcendent character. But if the doctrine of a Personal Prius, such as Christian Metaphysic and Religion consistently teach, be that which on the whole affords the best explanation of the physical and psychical phenomena comprehended in human life and Personality, then responsibility follows as a matter of course. And the nature and extent of the responsibility involved must be gathered from the manifestations of Himself and His Will which the Personal Prius has been pleased to make.[2]

[1] Cp. Ephes. iv. 13.

[2] "This knowledge" of the Will of God, says Count Tolstoy, "is not acquired by study, nor by the efforts of individuals, but through the reception by them of the manifestation of the Infinite

That manifestation, we Christians contend, has reached its climax, so far, in the Incarnation. And it is in the Incarnation, or in what flowed from it, we find the nature and extent of human responsibility most clearly defined. Christian apologetics do not fall within the scope of this work, but one observation I may, perhaps, be permitted to make. It is this: that, whatever be the cogency of the arguments for the Incarnation, it has, as a matter of fact, proved the greatest inspiration for good, the most potent factor in the moral progress of mankind, which the world has ever seen. And why so? Because the Ideal of perfection it sets up for our attainment is that of unselfish love. Herein we see the supreme manifestation of the Personal Prius. God is love, and the Incarnation is the actual expression of His love. But this love is not merely an object of æsthetic regard—something to be admired and wondered at. It is itself an incitement of love, an image of beauty to ravish the soul, and to be reproduced in each of the followers of Jesus. As He was, so are we to be in this world. "Each one of you must live My life; or, rather, I must

Mind, which little by little discloses itself to man."—*Religion and Morality*, p. 20.

live My life again in each of you; and each of you in your several stations and according to your several abilities must be a living Christ." And herein, if I mistake not, is to be found the secret of that inspiration which the Incarnation has ever exercised, and still continues to exercise, in the hearts and lives of men.

The Fatherhood of God, from which the Incarnation takes its rise, reveals to us as its logical outcome the brotherhood of man. And the result is a double sense of responsibility. As the personal offspring of the Personal Prius, bearing His image, and reflecting His attributes, I am answerable to Him for my life, and the use I make of it. I may not destroy that which is His gift; or, if I do, I must not cheat myself with the delusion that I shall not be held responsible.

And the brotherhood of man shows me that, after all, I am my brother's keeper; that I must no longer regard myself as an isolated individual at liberty to pursue my own interest, regardless of that of others. I am a member of the great social body of humanity, and whatever makes for the welfare of that body it is both my duty and my privilege to strive for. And if we can teach men the sanctity of human life, and the responsibility

which attaches to it; if we can bring them to feel that inspiration of love which radiates from the Incarnation, we shall perhaps be doing the best that can be done to render their lives at least endurable, if not useful and happy, and so removing some of the chief causes of suicide. It is because I believe the study of Personality in its manifold bearing on human life and character helps us to do all this, that I have gone into the subject at the length I have done. If to some of my readers the discussion has appeared too academic, and not of much practical utility, I would remind them, that the subject is one which, however transcendent in some of its aspects, comes down to, and embraces, in others even the trivial details, trials, and duties of our daily life.

From the cultured gentleman, or the University scholar, who justifies himself in his rash act by Schopenhauer's plausible but indefensible postulate of "*unassailable right*," down to the unhappy being whom sin, or sorrow, or shame has hounded to a self-sought and dishonoured grave, there is not one with whom these arguments should not have weight.

And, indeed, it is this intimate bearing of Personality on the problem of life that imparts

to it its chief importance. It is the golden chain which unites the Eternal Prius, the Uncaused Cause of all things, with the noblest of His creatures, the intelligent self-conscious soul of man. Without it man is an inexplicable enigma to himself, a mere waif and stray on the boundless ocean of being. He comes he knows not whence; he exists he knows not why; he goes he knows not whither. Without it he is severed from the eternal past, and cut off from the eternal future, his whole existence bounded by the limits of a few score years of joy and sorrow, of hope and despair.

But Personality enables us to co-ordinate man in the scale of being, and supplies, not only a rational theory of his origin, but also an intelligible reason and purpose for his existence. If on the one hand it invests his life with a solemn responsibility to himself, to his neighbour and his God, on the other, it sanctifies and ennobles it, and opens out for it the hope of a future of unspeakable dignity and happiness.

Without it Religion, in the true sense of the word, at least as I understand it, is impossible. The impersonal "Thought" of Hegel cannot supply it, nor the "Thelology" of Schopenhauer, nor the deified "Humanity" of Comte, nor the

"persistent Force" of Spencer. To Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory, with its strange concepts of psycho-physical parallelism" and "epiphenomena," we shall look in vain, for they present no foundation on which a religion can be built up. And so it comes to pass, that man is left to drift hither and thither on the sea of uncertainty, the sport of his own ever-changing speculations.

But in Personality, as it emerges from Christian Metaphysic and Religion, we seem to find our feet. Not only does it provide a reasonable theory of the Universe—that is, of the phenomena and noumena which form the objective element in human experience; but the subjective element, the self-conscious Ego, the personal soul of man, is both recognized and co-ordinated in the scale of being, and the lines of its further progress indicated.

"It is a noteworthy fact," says Professor Wundt, "that, despite the undoubted existence of reciprocal relations between religion, art, and science, one of the three, religion, should be regarded as gradually disappearing from the intellectual life. It is held that the stage of intellectual interest, which finds its satisfaction exclusively in the religious activities of the mind, is dying out. Art and science, it is thought, are filling the vacancy thus arising, and will, of course, free themselves

from the manifold relations that now bind them to the religious life." [1]

I would fain hope that such is not the case; for, if it be a fact, it is one of sinister omen for the moral and spiritual progress of mankind, and the production of those "higher psychical values" in which Professor Wundt believes that progress consists. Neither science nor art can reach down to those moral and spiritual activities, which form the very core of human Personality, and of which character and conduct are the outcome.[2]

As faith in the supra-sensible declines, the sense of responsibility grows proportionately weaker, and the unseen world and a future beyond the grave vanish, and cease to be restraining and stimulating influences on life and conduct. The

[1] *The Principles of Morality*, p. 219.

[2] Professor Wundt both indicates the fallacy of the opinion he records, and deprecates the down-grade movement. "The fundamental error is the opinion that religion is a primitive mode of thought destined to be supplanted by science." And again "Ethics, instead of limiting its attention to the merely individual and outward phenomenal forms, must recognize that the most enduring of all moral springs of action, that which determines the direction of all individual and social efforts, is the striving after an ideal, towards which the reality created by moral actions approximates, but to which it can never attain."—*The Principles of Morality*, p. 220.

life of man, instead of being elevated into higher regions of thought and motive and endeavour, tends to sink down to a lower moral and spiritual level, and finds its only sphere of action in a secular and sensuous existence. The very faculties which bespeak his Divine parentage, and at the same time fit him for intercourse and communion with his Divine Parent, become atrophied and paralyzed, for the simple reason that no fitting field for their exercise will remain. "*Corruptio optimi pessima.*" Is this truth destined to find its supreme and tragic illustration in the case of man? If not, it is only the realization of the relation in which the human Personality stands to the Divine that can avert so disastrous an issue.

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